A European solution for French nuclear weapons

In an interview on the TF1 television network on May 13, referring to France’s nuclear arsenal (the Force de frappe), the President of the French Republic, Emmanuel Macron, took a step forward from his speech at the “École de guerre” in February 2020. Five years ago, Macron hoped for the development of “a strategic dialogue with our European partners willing to discuss the role of French nuclear deterrence within the framework of collective security.” During the interview, Macron announced that he had initiated talks with Germany and Poland to consider whether and how France could extend nuclear deterrence to the entire European continent. In particular, Macron said he was ready to open discussions with the Europeans on the possibility of stationing French nuclear weapons on their territory.

This is an important development, but before commenting on it, it is worth clarifying a point that recurs frequently when discussing equipping Europe with a nuclear deterrence capability. It is argued that this deterrence should be based on the nuclear capabilities of France and Britain. This alternative is entirely theoretical, as the only autonomous nuclear arsenal controlled by a European country is that of France. The British nuclear arsenal is integrated into the U.S. nuclear arsenal and cannot be used without U.S. consent (unless British security is at risk). The four British submarines are equipped with American-made Trident ballistic missiles and employ nuclear warheads that are also American-made.

In his interview with TF1, Macron also clarified the conditions under which France is willing to place French nuclear weapons on the territory of other European countries. Interested countries would have to participate in financing the French nuclear umbrella, and ultimate control over its deployment would remain in the hands of the President of the French Republic. The possibility of European countries participating in the financing of France’s nuclear arsenal is an issue that dates back to 2022 when, a few months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s former finance minister Wolfgang Schëuble declared that, in exchange for the deterrence extended to Germany, Germany would have to help fund it.

This aspect of the problem, however, should be seen in the broader context of the level of military spending to be borne by European countries, which should not be set by the U.S., but by the EU, in agreement with European countries and not on the basis of a single percentage of GDP, but differentiated country by country. A country with nuclear weapons and a stronger naval force than other countries, such as France, is likely to incur a higher level of spending. Other countries, smaller in size and located in central Europe, have armed forces that require a lower level of spending. Provision should therefore be made to compensate countries willing to spend more than the European average via the European budget.

The most sensitive point raised by Macron is, of course, the fact that the final word on the use of the nuclear deterrent remains in the hands of the President of the French Republic. In the short term, no other solution is conceivable. In the medium to long term, it will be necessary to opt for a permanent solution at the European level: one perspective on which one might begin to reflect may be offered by the experience of American Federalism.

From the outset, the military structure of the U.S. had two levels: the federal level, with limited armed forces, and the state level, based on state militias, which, until the beginning of the 20th century comprised the majority of the American military structure. State constitutions have gradually included a provision that the Governor of the State “shall be Commander‑in‑Chief of the military forces of the State, except when they are called into the active service of the United States. ” Although, historically, the

provision is one that many states have struggled to comply with, it may provide a model for the extension and use of the French nuclear umbrella on the European continent. In other words, the French Constitution would specify that “the person in charge of the nuclear force is the President of the French Republic, until such time as the European Council decides to make use of it.” Symmetrically, similar wording would need to be included in the European Constitutional Treaty.

The problems raised by such a provision are beyond the scope of this article, which seels solely to put forward an institutional solution as a starting point for reflection. To some aspects, however, consideration can be given, the first of which concerns the world order the EU intends to pursue. It is widely believed that the EU is the only political community , albeit out of self-interest, capable of defending and supporting multilateral institutions to safeguard a world order based on shared rules. Hence, the provision set out here for the permanent availability of the French nuclear arsenal is preferable (not only for reasons of speed) to a solution involving equipping the EU with its own nuclear arsenal, requiring the development of R&D and the direct production of a nuclear arsenal by the EU.

Such a choice would give the wrong signal to the rest of the world, bringing the EU into the arms race, which in 2024, according to SIPRI statistics, recorded worldwide arms at a record high of $2.7 trillion at current prices. The suggestion here is based on recognition that nuclear weapons are a deterrent against a possible aggressor, without resorting to what justifiably would be seen as nuclear proliferation. In essence, it would be a kind of “realistic pacifism” (or “peaceful realism”) inspired by the Gorbachevian idea of a “defensive defence.”

The second aspect concerns another currently held view that security and foreign policy go together, and cannot be separated. Again, it should be remembered that the EU will become a federal, not a united, institutional system. Therefore, it does not follow that a common security policy requires a common foreign policy. Strictly speaking, a common European security policy, including the use, if necessary, of nuclear weapons, in the manner set out here, can be decided independently of a common foreign policy. Necessary – this certainly – is the common assessment of external threats to the European political community against which the EU is to defend itself. The common view of the threats to European security is the indispensable step for the activation of the “double-button” procedure, i.e. the same procedure currently in force within the Atlantic Alliance, in this case, however, placed in a democratic framework.

Such a decision in a political community comprising historically established nation-states cannot be made by a simple majority vote: it should be, if not unanimous, then passed by an overwhelming majority of EU countries, utilising the constructive abstention mechanism set out in EU treaties for countries that do not agree with the list of identified threats, or alternatively the procedure chosen to override the Hungarian veto on sanctions against Russia (essentially, a “coffee break” for the dissenting country). Needless to say, once threats to the EU were identified, these assessments would be put to a vote in the European Parliament.

The final aspect is what European institution should have the power to “push the button” in the event of a nuclear threat from third countries. Realistically, the only institution able to assume such a power is the European Council – responsible for analysing, evaluating and establishing the credibility of the threats – in the person of its President, who may also act according to a French initiative. These suggestions require more in-depth evaluation but the time for this is running out.

The title of this article is taken from an article written in 1943 by Judah Magnes, Rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for Foreign Affairs, in which he proposed a regional federation. This shows that there was a political project that the most lucid Arab and Jewish minds had tried to bring to the world’s attention, because they clearly foresaw the consequences that would result from a failure to find a political solution to the Palestinian problem. Its relevance lies in the fact that the current conflict continues to remind us of the choice between an increasingly devastating regional war that threatens to expand and the project suggested by Magnes.

The heinous act of terror by Hamas on 7 October last year, and the disproportionate Israeli reaction it provoked, are only the most recent consequences of the tragic predictions of the time. They obscure, however, the deep political and cultural reasons for the conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinians and, therefore, the responsibilities that Europe has towards this part of the world. These responsibilities are to be found in European history from the second half of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th. It therefore encompasses the period in which the positive phase of the call for nationhood as a means of giving the people a state came to an end (“as long as the State is only 5% of the population, it will never be stable”, said Mario Albertini, referring to European history) and the period in which the power politics of European states reached its peak and transformed the call for nationhood into nationalism, which has become the ideology on which the legitimacy of a historically determined type of State is based: the national, bureaucratic and centralised State. It should, however, be pointed out immediately that being a historically determined institution, just as it had a beginning, it may have an end, being superseded by more advanced institutional forms of human coexistence. The fact remains that, in that historical period, the nation-state established itself in Europe as an exclusive political community which demanded the absolute loyalty of its citizens and did not admit any difference in language, culture, or religion: European nationalism would soon turn into racism.

This was the political-cultural climate in which the Zionist ideology matured, based on nationalism and described in very harsh terms by Hannah Arendt [1]. Indeed, European nationalism turned into a political culture that spread to the rest of the world and also constituted the context in which Theodor Herzl’s project of the creation of a Jewish State matured. This was initially envisaged in one of the colonies of the European powers, but was later established in the Palestine of the British Mandate. The project, based on the establishment of an exclusive political community, proved to be disastrous not only for the Arab people, but also for the Jewish people themselves. With reference to the latter, in addition to Arendt, the historiographical current known as the “new Israeli historiography” has not failed to point this out. Ilan Pappé, a Jewish historian, anti-Zionist, and a leading exponent of this current, has recently reopened the debate on the controversial “Dalet Plan”, which led to the exodus of the Palestinian population at the time of the birth of the State of Israel, speaking explicitly of “ethnic cleansing” [2].

Arendt recalls that already during the first half of the 20th century there were repeated Arab-Israeli initiatives that could have channelled relations between Israelis and Palestinians “into constructive political institutions” [3]. One of these initiatives is the one mentioned above by Magnes. He criticised both the idea of an Arab State with some rights recognised for the Jewish minority and the idea of a Jewish state with some rights recognised for the Arab-Palestinian minority. The aim, according to Magnes, was not to establish a unitary political community (State or Commonwealth) that would bring together populations of different culture, language or religion, but to establish a federation between Israel, Lebanon, the then Transjordan and Palestine. The institutional project was therefore not that of a European-style nation State, but rather the American project of a federal union between a number of States.

Since this vision has been abandoned, the situation in the Middle East has become even more complicated: existing local tensions have been compounded by the clash between world powers interested in the area and the religious radicalisation of many of the actors involved. Thus the most pessimistic predictions of the time have come true. To this we must add the fact that today the global situation has changed. New players in world politics have appeared, the USA, to which Israel has entrusted its security, has been weakened.

In recent months, the idea of establishing two States is gaining increasing support, as is the number of States recognising the Palestinian State. Among them are nine EU States: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Sweden. However, as it seems unrealistic that this would be enough to end the centuries-old conflict, the idea of a subsequent federation between the two States is also gaining ground. Yet the idea of establishing a federal union between only two States would not work for obvious reasons. It would be necessary, rather, to start again from Magnes’ proposal, the only workable suggestion, with a view to its further enlargement, as was also the wish, albeit for the long term, of Aubrey ‘Abba’ Eban.

In this context, the EU could take the initiative and declare its readiness for a plan consisting of two measures: the provision, together with other countries, of a military force to secure the borders of the two States; and the revival of the proposal Jacques Delors presented to the Centre Europeen Juif d’Information in Brussels in November 1993 (two months after the Oslo Accords) to set up joint institutions for the management of water resources, energy and infrastructure. This proposal also aimed to follow up on what Shimon Peres had hinted at in an interview with Le Monde a few days earlier. Peres had hinted at the possibility of creating a regional common market and Delors had argued that as in the case of the precedent set by the EU, this proposal needed concrete applications, to give rise to “de facto solidarity”.

We have limited ourselves here to recalling a series of proposals that have already been made, adding that the initiative in relaunching them can only be taken by the EU, whose member States, in founding the EU, initiated the process of superseding the nation State as the exclusive form of political association. However, it cannot be the only actor, because an initiative coming from the “West” would no longer be accepted: representatives of what is now called “the global South” will also have to be involved, within the framework of multilateral institutions. It may seem an impossible project, but two precedents can be recalled: the first, that of Altiero Spinelli, who, when the Nazi troops had already entered Paris, had the intellectual courage to think up and write the ‘Manifesto for a free and united Europe’, i.e. the political programme for a European federation; the second is the meeting held at Bretton Woods, while the war was still going on, at which the first multilateral institutions were designed. It is therefore not unthinkable that such courage could emerge between Palestinians and Israelis, especially if supported by a strong EU initiative.

The Italian version of the article was published by the online newspaper, Eurobull (https://www.eurobull.it/verso-la-pace-in-palestina-le-responsabilita-europee?lang=fr
). The English version was kindly reviewed by Anne Parry.

Notes
[1] Hannah Arendt, Rethinking Zionism, 1945
[2] Ilan Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, 2008
[3] Hannah Arendt, Peace or Armistice in the Near East?, 1950

Perhaps the best perspective for understanding the political cycle that is beginning for the new American Administration is that offered by the editor of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Rose. According to Rose, the global political cycle that is now commencing had its origins in Woodrow Wilson‘s attempt to establish an international order based on the League of Nations (the first founding act); it continued with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s success in establishing multilateral institutions, whose functioning, however, was based on American power (second founding act); it continued with the extension of the multilateral order, promoted by George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, to new sectors, such as finance, and to new areas of the world, such as China’s entry into the WTO, but not Gorbachev’s USSR, which could not benefit from the global market (third founding act). This, however, took place without adequate consolidation of the governance capacity of the existing multilateral institutions, since the underlying idea was that the global leadership of the USA (the “indispensable nation“) was sufficient for their functioning. This choice marked the beginning of the end of the American century. The fourth founding act, which should consist of relaunching the so-called “liberal world order”, now in crisis, is the challenge that awaits Joe Biden. According to Rose, Biden should resume the Rooseveltian path, and also introduce, according to others, new multilateral institutions promoted by the Western democracies alone, such as the Transatlantic Strategic Partnership Agreement .

This solution is based on a theoretical-practical assumption that we believe is wrong. It is wrong to attribute the disastrous military interventions, the endless wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and the financial crises and growing economic inequalities that followed Bush senior and Clinton Administrations, to the failure of a non-existent “liberal world order“. This expression, if applied to the current multilateral order, is in fact an oxymoron: if one intervenes in a country to “export democracy”, one can find oneself – as in fact has happened – in one of the three unhappy situations predicted by the liberal John Stuart Mill (A Few Words on Non-Intervention, 1859), including the absence of an internal consensus of a democratic political system that forces a permanent military presence. But it is above all with respect to the contrast of financial crises and global economic inequalities that another liberal, Lionel Robbins, reminds us that “the institutions characteristic of a liberal society are inconceivable without a government” and that “it should be evident that they are incompatible with the lack of security” (Economic Planning and International Order, 1937), highlighting that the government of globalization is the missing element.

To date, the only instruments that come close to this latter ideal are multilateral institutions, the most important legacy of the American century, which allowed us to move from a world of sovereign and independent states to a world of sovereign and interdependent states. American multilateralism, which matured in a context where political situations appeared insurmountable, reached its zenith in the early years following the end of World War II. Since then, partly because of the culpable delay in Europe’s progress towards unification, the logic of power politics has prevailed, and the American role has progressively taken on the guise of hegemony, eroding, over time, the most innovative and noble aspects of multilateralism. However, this later decline takes nothing away from the revolutionary significance of the original premises of multilateralism. With it, for the first time, the prospect of progressive world unification was no longer confined to the sphere of ideal aspirations, but could be the object of concrete policy and, therefore, become possible.

Certainly, it will be necessary to strengthen multilateral institutions, and allow them to function. The change of pace is that indicated by Joseph Stiglitz, for whom “The only way forward is through true multilateralism, in which American exceptionalism is genuinely subordinated to common interests and values, international institutions, and a form of rule of law from which the US is not exempt“. In particular, they should allow those institutions to pursue the purposes for which they were established. But this is not enough: a country’s voluntarism alone does not overcome the existing power relations between states. It is necessary for the USA, and other willing countries, to be joined by the EU, so as to form an alliance within the multilateral institutions – United Nations, WTO, IMF, World Bank, ILO, etc., of which, for better or worse, authoritarian countries are also part – to enable these institutions to provide global public goods and affirm the universal values for which they are responsible. Only in this framework can the idea of the Concert or League of Democracies make sense. With the recent EU-China agreement on investments, the Union has timidly begun to set an example, asking China to respect the ILO conventions – to which it adheres.

The end of the American century does not mean that the US no longer has a decisive role to play. It only means that, isolated, and without renouncing a part of their sovereignty, the US will not be able to contribute to the birth of a new world order. Biden cannot reverse what, with increasing evidence, is looming as an irreversible historical trend: American decline and the emergence of China and other continental powers. What Biden can give Europe, and the rest of the world, is four years to design a new world order, because Trump’s election, as evidenced by the more than 70 million votes he received, was not a mere parenthesis in American politics.

The decisive word will have to come from the Europeans, who will have to decide, for example, whether to promote the entry of the EU as such into multilateral institutions alongside, in a transitional phase, its member states. The road ahead will take a long time and a great deal of imagination, especially in identifying, for each of the multilateral institutions, the “spark of supranationality“, as Altiero Spinelli called it, which will allow them to function autonomously, without being completely conditioned by the evolution of power relations within them. There is a criterion that can help assess the appropriateness of the solutions that will be proposed from time to time: it is the one contained in the Lisbon Treaty, where, in Art. 1, it says that the objective of the EU is the creation of “an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe“, respectful of universal values. In our case, that of the “fourth founding act”, it would be to create an ever closer union among the peoples of the world: the only criterion that can guide the reform and management of multilateral institutions and that the world community could share.