Nationalism and pacifism: a critical mix (*)

1945. George Orwell.

Nationalism. Multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism.

NATIONALIST FEELING

In October 1945 George Orwell published an article, Notes on Nationalism in Polemic: A Magazine of Philosophy, Psychology & Aesthetics. (Fig. 1)

Fig. 1 The publication Polemic: A Magazine of Philosophy, Psychology & Aesthetics. 1945

Immediately afterwards, Penguin Books included the article in a book.(Orwell, 2018)
The book had a specific, circumscribed aim: to analyse nationalist feeling among English intellectuals during the Second Word War.
It struck me that this notion of nationalist “feeling” might be useful in an attempt to understand the current positions of western intellectuals, particularly in Universities, regarding the current wars and multiculturalism.
Orwell is at pains to point out how many English and western intellectuals adopted critical or openly anti-western stances before and during the Second World War.
After the Russian attack on Ukraine, we seem to be living in a period that has some similarities with 1938, so much so that Orwell’s book may be particularly relevant today.
For Orwell “nationalism” is a feeling that may refer to a nation, an ethnicity, a geographical area, a religion or a social class.
“By ‘nationalism’ I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled ‘good’ or ‘bad’. But secondly – and this is much more important – I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognizing no other duty than that of advancing its interests. Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism. Both words are normally used in so vague a way that any definition is liable to be challenged, but one must draw a distinction between them, since two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally.
Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power. The abiding purpose of every nationalist is to secure more power and more prestige, not for himself but for the nation or other unit in which he has chosen to sink his own individuality. (Orwell, 2018).

According to Orwell nationalist thinking is obsessive, unstable and indifferent to reality. and tendencies such as communism, political Catholicism, Zionism, antisemitism, Trotskyism and Pacifism.
It can be divided roughly into three categories. Positive, Negative or Transferred Nationalism.
Positive for Orwell are patriotic, non-aggressive forms of nationalism serving one’s own interests, such as Celtic (Irish, Welsh) nationalism, unlike Anglophobic forms of nationalism which he regards as Negative.

For my purposes, Transferred Nationalism is the most interesting of the three, since Orwell suggests that nationalist feeling can move away from one’s own country to another.
“In societies such as ours, it is unusual for anyone describable as an intellectual to feel a very deep attachment to his own country. Public opinion – that is, the section of public opinion of which he as an intellectual is aware – will not allow him to do so. Most of the people surrounding him are sceptical and disaffected, and he may adopt the same attitude from imitativeness or sheer cowardice: in that case he will have abandoned the form of nationalism that lies nearest to hand without getting any closer to a genuinely internationalist outlook. He still feels the need for a Fatherland, and it is natural to look for one somewhere abroad. Having found it, he can wallow unrestrainedly in exactly those emotions from which he believes that he has emancipated himself. God, the King, the Empire, the Union Jack – all the overthrown idols can reappear under different names, and because they are not recognized for what they are they can be worshipped with a good conscience. Transferred nationalism, like the use of scapegoats, is a way of attaining salvation without altering one’s conduct.” (Orwell, 2018).

Orwell sees examples of Transferred Nationalism in Communism, political Catholicism, racism, class prejudice and pacifism. In particular, his view of pacifism as Transferred Nationalism strikes me as astonishingly relevant today.“Pacifism. The majority of pacifists either belong to obscure religious sects or are simply humanitarians who object to the taking of life and prefer not to follow their thoughts beyond that point. But there is a minority of intellectual pacifists whose real though unadmitted motive appears to be hatred of western democracy and admiration of totalitarianism. Pacifist propaganda usually boils down to saying that one side is as bad as the other, but if one looks closely at the writings of younger intellectual pacifists, one finds that they do not by any means express impartial disapproval but are directed almost entirely against Britain and the United States. Moreover, they do not as a rule condemn violence as such, but only violence used in defence of the western countries. The Russians, unlike the British, are not blamed for defending themselves by warlike means, and indeed all pacifist propaganda of this type avoids mention of Russia or China. It is not claimed, again, that the Indians should abjure violence in their struggle against the British. Pacifist literature abounds with equivocal remarks which, if they mean anything, appear to mean that statesmen of the type of Hitler are preferable to those of the type of Churchill, and that violence is perhaps excusable if it is violent enough. After the fall of France, the French pacifists, faced by a real choice which their English colleagues have not had to make, mostly went over to the Nazis, and in England there appears to have been some small overlap of membership between the Peace Pledge Union and the Blackshirts. Pacifist writers have written in praise of Carlyle, one of the intellectual fathers of Fascism. All in all, it is difficult not to feel that pacifism, as it appears among a section of the intelligentsia, is secretly inspired by an admiration for power and successful cruelty. The mistake was made of pinning this emotion to Hitler, but it could easily be retransferred.” (Orwell, 2018).

MULTICULTURALISM AND MASOCHISTIC NATIONALISM

In the international debate I have not found significant references to Orwell’s article. The sole exceptions are two books by Göran Adamson, considered, like Orwell, a “leftwing liberal”. He cites Orwell profusely in his first book, which analyzes the approach of Swedish Universities to diversity and multiculturalism (“A Trojan Horse. A Leftist Critique of Multiculturalism in the West”, Adamson, 2017). In his second book (Adamson, 2021), he uses the term “Masochistic Nationalism” (or “Self-critical Nationalism”) to describe the anti-western stances of many “leftist” intellectuals, whilst confining to the “Right” the traditional notion of Sovereigntist Nationalism (Adamson, 2021).
Adamson sees Masochistic Nationalism or Self-critical Nationalism as fairly widespread in the non-liberal left which, in recent years, has extolled diversity and multiculturalism. He links this to the Transferred Nationalism Orwell attributed to English intellectuals.
A focus on diversity – for different but mutually reinforcing reasons – is a common trait of the Masochist/Self-Critical Left and the Nationalist Right. For the Right, it serves the purpose of demanding separation, in order to maintain one’s own culture, income and so on. The Left seeks to help the weak, disadvantaged and persecuted, but its acritical exaltation of multiculturalism risks considering individuals of a given ethnicity merely as members of a group, undermining the liberal model of individual freedom.
In the preface to his book, “A Trojan Horse”, Adamson writes:
“Multiculturalism is a conservative idea, which is seen as progressive. Multiculturalism and diversity are about background, ethnicity, belonging, spokespersons and roots. Those who talk about roots talk about an idyll of the past, a historical Eldorado in contrast to universal suffrage, technological progress, and everything else that belongs to modern society.
….
Critiques against diversity, we are told, come from the right. This book takes the opposite position. Convincing criticism against diversity always comes from a leftist perspective, from those who advocate meritocracy instead of group rights, majority and democracy instead of adoration of minorities, equality between men and women instead of patriarchy, the rule of law instead of ‘minority legislation’, science instead of belief, debate instead of censorship, modernity and the bliss of forgetting instead of an obsession with historical injustice
……….
Moreover, the ideology of diversity shows numerous similarities with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism profits from diversity, and diversity comes in handy to the neoliberals. The Swedish establishment has allowed a Trojan horse into its midst.  (Adamson, 2017)

Adamson comes to these conclusions after analyzing the result of the Swedish government project Diversity at the University, funding Universities that promote diversity in the academic world.
His concern is that structural justice (or injustice) can produce benefits or disadvantages for groups, contradicting the mission of the Universities themselves.
Universities need to promote the freedom and equality of individuals, not groups.
As a result of the model of structural justice, group identity is seen as more important than individual choice. Due to the ideology of diversity, criticizing minority groups, previously perceived as vulnerable, is deemed improper.
If Universities are asked to affirm the value of diversity when enrolling students, their role is put into question.
By idealizing vulnerable groups, individuals who do not agree with the group are abandoned to themselves.
It is useful to compare Adamson’s view with that of Kenan Malik, in his book Multiculturalism and its Discontents: Rethinking Diversity after 9/11 (Manifestos for the 21st Century).
“What is striking is that many of the arguments of right-wing critics of multiculturalism, who refer to the thesis of the clash of civilizations, are similar to those of the supporters of multiculturalism. ….
Behind the hostility, however, the two sides share the basic assumptions about the nature of culture, identity and difference. Both consider the main social divisions as the result of a cultural or civilizational matrix. Both see cultures, or civilizations, as homogeneous entities. Both insist on the crucial importance of cultural identity and the preservation of this identity. Both perceive conflicts that emerge from non-negotiable values as unsolvable. (Malik, 2016).

COSMOPOLITANISM

In the current debate on peace and the ongoing wars it seems to me that what is lacking is any indication of a path that may concretely lead to a reduction in conflicts. There is no mention of a cosmopolitan prospect for the human race, i.e. the Planetary Man of Ernesto Balducci.
Cosmopolitanism suggests that, needs must, men should be citizens of the world, overcoming the social and political differences between states and nations.
If not cosmopolitanism, what other solution exists for the future of mankind in the Anthropocene? (Montani, 2022).
According to Federalists, nation states (or empires) are not the only way to organize human society. Nationalism is born when the state – freeing itself of the power previously exercised by the Church and/or the Empire, and becoming “absolutely sovereign” (the Westphalian system) – needs to base its legitimacy on a new entity: the nation. Historically, this was made forcefully clear by the French revolution when, overnight, the King’s subjects, previously Alsatians, Bretons, Occitan speakers and so on, became the “French”. They used to fight and die for the King; now they fought and died for the “French nation”. Nationalism is therefore the ideology of the bureaucratic, centralized nation state (Albertini, 1997).
The process of European unification shows that states and nations previously at war over many centuries can come together, an improvement not only in terms of peace but also economically, socially and for human rights.
Although the successful model of European unification, described in this issue by Antonio Longo, indicates the past and future path for its cosmopolitan construction, its originality and potential are underestimated.
Opponents of European unification include not only sovereigntists but, paradoxically, the proponents of multiculturalism, self-critical of a “European Homeland”. Due to the ongoing process of European construction, European patriotism cannot become nationalism. The federal model balances the power of the state with that of a supranational government, respecting nations and European cultures.
The powers, large and small, of the state, as well as economic and religious powers do not seem to understand the risks their increasingly aggressive attitude involves.
Peace and Cosmopolitanism may be imposed by Nature, climate and environmental risks that may force human beings to cooperate to the benefit of all.
Mitigating global warming is a common aim that can be achieved solely by controlling greenhouse gas emissions. Adapting to global warming, on the other hand, could cause even more catastrophic conflicts if faced with a nationalist logic.
Meanwhile, climate change is causing conflict. The consequences of drought in Syria in 2006-2009 were considered one of the leading causes of the civil war. A detailed and accurate report by Imperial College (F. Otto et al, 2023) attributes the early century drought to climate change and warns of a disastrous climate future for the Middle East.
Longo’s proposed “Middle-eastern economic community for water and energy” including Israel, Jordan and other willing countries could kick off a process similar to that of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first step in the peace process in Europe and in the prosperity of Europeans. Based on its experience, a Federal Europe could help this collaboration.

When shared, scientific and technological research helps to face the challenge of the environmental crisis and energy transition. In this issue, Tommaso Pacetti indicates the forms of cooperation that are possible in order to overcome water shortage and other environmental emergencies, fostering a process of sharing and non-conflictual relations.
Luciano Ipsaro Palesi and Paola Zamperlin take on the subject of Artificial Intelligence, highlighting the risks, its potential, and the ongoing conflicts.
It should be noted that the European Union is already recognized internationally for its positive role in the climate debate and for the need to control Artificial Intelligence, as shown by the albeit modest results of the Dubai Climate Conference in 2023 and the regulations governing the use of AI recently introduced by the EU.

The federal approach which brought about peace in Europe is often forgotten and, with it, the dream of a United States of Europe. Yet, Federalism is the best hope of defeating the nationalism of states, organizations and people, enabling a non-aggressive form of patriotism in communities and nations.

George Orwell too believed in the European Federation:
 “In March 1945, in Paris, in a now liberated Europe, Altiero Spinelli organized a conference with Albert Camus, Emmanuel Mounier, André Philip, George Orwell and others, in which a Provisional Committee for the European Federation was approved.” (Spinelli, 2023, from the Preface by Guido Montani).

REFERENCES

G. Adamson, The Trojan Horse: A Leftist Critique of Multiculturalism in the West, Post-Diversity Press, 2017.
G. Adamson, Masochistic Nationalism: Multicultural Self-Hatred and the Infatuation with the Exotic, Routledge Studies in Political Sociology, 2021.
M. Albertini, Lo Stato nazionale, Il Mulino,1997
L. A. Ipsaro Palesi, P. Zamperlin, Intelligenza Artificiale e conflitti, Testimonianze, n. 555-556, 2024.
A. Longo, La guerra, la pace e l’ordine mondiale, Testimonianze, n. 555-556, 2024.
K. Malik, Il multiculturalismo e i suoi critici. Ripensare la diversità dopo l’11 settembre. Unione degli Atei e degli Agnostici Razionalisti – UAAR-, 2016.
G. Montani, Antropocene, Nazionalismo e Cosmopolitismo – Prospettive per i cittadini del Mondo. Mimesis, 2022.
G. Orwell, Notes on Nationalism, Penguin Random House, 2018.
F.  Otto et al, Human-induced climate change compounded by socio-economic water stressors increased severity of drought in Syria, Iraq and Iran, Imperial College, 2023.
T. Pacetti, Gestire le risorse idriche per costruire un futuro di pace, Testimonianze, n. 555-556, 2024.
A. Spinelli, La mia battaglia per un’Europa diversa, Edited by Guido Montani, Edizioni Società Aperta, 2023.

(*) The Italian version of this text was published in the Rivista Testimonianze, NN. 555 – 556. (https://www.testimonianzeonline.com/2024/11/nn-555-556-the-age-of-global-citizens/)

The wars just over the EU borders have brought back into focus the most demonic and evil form of power, i.e. military force. EU citizens have not been subjected to this kind of power for 80 years. Not because Italians, French, Germans and other Europeans have become pacifists or better people, but because a particular historical process has developed in this part of the world, resulting in common institutions (the European Union) that have made war between Europeans impossible, actually unthinkable. This is not common knowledge, because people believe new things only when they are well-established, as Machiavelli said. 

On February 24, 2022, a war started that aimed to change the world – for the worse. There were three basic reasons behind the Russian aggression: the determination that Ukraine should return to the “Russian world” (Russkij mir); the removal of individual EU countries from American hegemony, and the establishment of a new world order with a reduction in the importance of the West and the return of Russia to a key role in the world. ^[1]

On October 7, 2023, yet another war began in the Middle East, between two peoples and two nationalist aspirations, one that has already become a state (Israel), the other seeking statehood (Palestine/Hamas). Each claims the identical territory: the conflict has inevitably become radicalized. Each has its own system of international alliances: there is a risk that the conflict will spread to other states. 

In the area of the Pacific, the cold war between China and the United States has given rise to tensions which are even more dangerous for world peace: there, attempts are being made to set up a new world order based on two superpowers, which is dangerous, among other reasons, because it is outdated and unrealistic. Africa is troubled by endless conflicts, prey to old and new forms of imperialism, torn between various nationalist movements and in search of a difficult path to continental unity. 

In short, nationalism is rearing its head again, in Europe and the world. 

Clash of opposing principles.

We are faced with a contradiction that is even more extreme now than it was in the past. Globalisation tends to make states interdependent, economically, socially and culturally, thus uniting the world. However, the world continues to be governed by the principle according to which each state thinks of itself as ‘independent’ and fully sovereign, even for issues common to all, such as the environment, health, trade, digital, technology, social and territorial imbalances, migration etc. The term ‘sovereignty’ no longer applies in today’s world, which is interdependent in its essential needs.^[2]   A fully sovereign state inevitably belligerently seeks its own “living space” if there are no supranational institutions to govern its relations. Thus, Hitler’s lebensraum returns today in Putin’s Russkij mir, both ideologies of nation-states with an imperialist mission. This is why pacifism, in itself, is not enough, because it does not alter the (violent) nature of relations between states which think and act as if they were fully sovereign, waging war on each other as the highest expression of the sovereignty they lay claim to.^[3]

A little over two centuries ago, Kant proposed a new direction based on reason. He suggested that just as “savage man was forced to renounce his brutal freedom and seek peace and security in a legal constitution”  states need to “leave the illegal state of barbarism and enter into a federation of peoples, in which each state, even the smallest, can hope for its security and the safeguarding of its rights not from its own force or legal assessments, but only from this great federation of peoples (Völkerbund),  from collective strength and deliberations according to the laws of the common will.” ^[4]

Kant’s indications go further: without supranational federal institutions to guarantee peace among states, the fundamental values of freedom, justice and equality cannot be fully realized; not only among peoples, but also within each individual state; in war, states drastically limit the internal space for freedom and democracy.

Kant is prophetic. The destructive potential of nuclear weapons means that the problem of overcoming the division into sovereign states can no longer be regarded as a theoretical question of an enlightened mind, but must stand as the political goal of our time. To live with war involves accepting the idea of the total degradation of morality and the ultimate demise of the human species. It is this situation, then, that, according to Kant, will drive states “to do what reason…might have suggested: that is, to leave behind the illegal state of barbarism and enter into a federation of peoples.” 

Roughly the same time, on the other side of the ocean, thirteen former colonies of the British Empire were deciding whether to remain divided or to unite after the Declaration of Independence (1776). Supporters of the union reminded their citizens of how the European continent had set a bad example: the states in Europe were divided and had gone from one war to another, amidst endless atrocities and misery. And they drew the lesson from history that led them to opt for a federal union, the United States of America (Philadelphia Convention, 1787): “To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.” (Alexander Hamilton,The Federalist).  They took Kant’s teachings to heart. 

We know that this idea is at the root of the process of European unification, which was inspired by the Ventotene Manifesto (“For a free and united Europe”), and is a fundamental goal of political action in our time, as Altiero Spinelli often recalled. It is said that the “new dividing line between progress and reaction” is between those who want to move beyond the absolute sovereignty of states, sharing it in some areas, in order to “create a solid international state”; and those who, on the contrary, want to preserve absolute sovereignty, often without realizing that this claim is purely ideological, and has no solid basis in reality.

The process of European unification, initiated by the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950, raised the problem of “institutionalized” peace as the starting point (A united Europe was not achieved: we had war), linking the construction of Europe to the goal of peace: “It proposes that production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of Europe. The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of the common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have become the most constant victims.

…. .The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.”  It was, therefore, at that precise moment that war became “unthinkable” in our countries, first for the Six “founding” member states and now for the Twenty-seven. Despite many flaws, this European Union has “disarmed” relations between the States. We can, therefore, say that Europe, governed by these institutions, now represents an area of “achieved peace” among its citizens. The message of Ventotene has brought European unification to life, and demonstrated that it is a constitutional process of a federal nature.

Europe and the World

What foreign policy should the European Union adopt today? The values that should inspire its action are inherent in its DNA: peace as the result of a system of supranational norms, sustainabilityas an economic-social model, and supranational democracy as the culmination of the historical development of citizenship. On what principles should a foreign policy capable of pursuing these values be based? Principles that, to be effective, must apply no longer only to Europe, but also to the world. This is a new principle that revolutionizes the traditional approach of the foreign policy of states which aim to increase the power of their own state to the detriment of others. We can, therefore, broadly formulate the following guiding principles for European foreign policy.

1) International security. The security of a state cannot be acquired by an enlargement of its sphere of influence, that is, with less security for others (I am safer if you are weaker). On the contrary, security must be mutual (I am safe if you are safe too). This principle must first be initiated in Europe, with the creation of the “common European home” (Gorbachev) as an alternative to the Putin regime’s policy of aggression. If this principle takes hold in Europe, then it can take hold elsewhere.

2) Interdependence among states. Under the system of absolute sovereignty, a state’s independence is assured by its strength. Interdependence, on the other hand, aims to enable states to find the right balance between autonomy and the achievement of common shared goals. With the ECSC, for example, interdependence between France, Germany and the other states was achieved through the creation of a High Authority that jointly managed the production and distribution of resources. So, interdependence and security for all. A similar solution could be pursued in the Middle East^[5] and for the ‘governance’ of global public goods. This will lead to the primacy of universal law over that of the individual state, just as European law has primacy in Europe.

3) Multilateralism. This is the natural development of the policy of enlargement. Europe’s borders have never been defined, because the process of unity does not aim to create a “bordered” state, but to seek shared security with neighbouring states through common supranational institutions. What we call “borders” (limes) are actually “thresholds” (limen), which allow us to imagine relations between different areas of the world as open federations. 

4) Regulatory power, that is, the EU’s capacity to produce rules. It has been doing this for seventy years, bringing together its citizens with rules in the fields of consumption, trade, transport, environmental protection, human rights etc. The EU is a “powerhouse” in this area; no other country in the world has developed a similar process. The European rules-based culture will come into its own when it becomes clear that “global public goods” cannot be governed by the force of individual states such as China, the US or others.

Based on these principles it will be possible: (a) to transform NATO into an equal partnership, a condition that would also be a guarantee (for Russia) that the end of the war in Ukraine will not result in the strengthening of American power in Europe, rather in the emergence of a truly autonomous Europe; (b) to base the “new world order” on a multilateral system with several pillars (U.S., EU, China, Russia, India, Latin America, Africa), rather than on powers vying for hegemony; (c) to reform the UN, by opening the Security Council to all major areas of the world and eliminating the power of veto in the Security Council, making way for the emergence of a world parliament.

EU foreign policy will thus be geared to reproducing the principle of federal unity, the basis of its initial political project, on a global scale.

Antonio Longo

^[1] The reference is to a text published by “La Fondation pour l’innovation politique” – Fondapol.org on 2/3/2022, entitled “La Russie n’a pas seulement défié l’Occident, elle a montré que l’ère de la domination occidentale mondiale peut être considérée comme complètement et définitivement révolue.” This is a translation of an article that appeared on 26/2/2022 in the Russian RIA Novosti news agency (later removed), under the title “Russia’s advent and the new world order.” This article describes the imperialist project conceived by Putin: the total russification of Ukraine and Belarus as the starting point of a recomposition of a new world order that would undermine the West.

^[2] Sovereignty is a  very old term that refers to the idea of a single and indivisible centre of power in a state. The global challenges of our time, however, demonstrate two things. The first is that states (not even the largest) are no longer truly “sovereign,” since they can no longer solve problems alone; they are forced to cooperate in one way or another. The second is that the “capacity to act” of states (another old definition of sovereignty) lies not so much in taking decisions (making laws etc) or making choices, but in “the ability to control the outcome of what you have decided” (as Mario Draghi says). Otherwise, you are not actually “sovereign”. Now, in the context of the enormous challenges facing humanity, this “ability to control” can only exist in a situation of maximum interdependence between states, that is, at the world (federal) level. This means that with federalism it is possible to control the use of power, this is no longer true with national sovereignty.

^[3] Because of the radical opposition of principles in the field, the outcome of the Ukrainian conflict may have two possible alternative conclusions: 1) negotiations over the partitioning of the occupied territories: in this case, it will be clear that aggression paid off in the end. This would be a victory of the principle of “absolute” state sovereignty and, a defeat of the principle of “relative” sovereignty, at the basis of European unity; 2) the implosion/defeat of the current regime in Moscow (as a result of facts unimaginable today) and the agreement by  a new Russia to become part of a security system in Europe, governed by common institutions.

^[4] Immanuel Kant,  Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, Thesis VII, 1784.

^[5] For the reasons given above, the “two peoples two states” formula reproduces the model of states which are completely sovereign (to wage war on each other), unless a strong federal constraint (a shared government for security purposes) is created. The ECSC model seems the most realistic, with the creation of a “Middle East Economic Community for Water and Energy” between Israel, Jordan and other interested countries: it would be this (institutionalized) community of interests that would guarantee peace for all states and peoples concerned, including the Palestinians.

Since it was put forward by the European Commission in May 2020, the concept of “open strategic autonomy” has become a centrepiece of the EU’s action in its internal and external dimensions. Another relevant idea is that of the “Brussels Effect”, which refers to the unique way how EU rules are capable to exert global influence. Putting the two together, the EU finds itself in the unique position to practice a mode of leadership open to anyone willing to share its values and recognising its rules, that we could call “open regulatory leadership”.

Open strategic autonomy is aimed at leading the way on the green and digital transition, to enable the EU to take a primary role in setting rules at the global level. Thanks to this, the EU will be able to win the challenge posed by alternative socio-economic models, benefitting from the first mover advantage in defining norms that can become global standards – especially in the field of digital and green technologies. What is more, the EU is not alone the global market of policy ideas. Therefore, this action becomes even more crucial not just to support the European strategy in this domain, but also as an alternative to other models that are being developed and proactively pushed by other world powers.

This short essay focuses on the intersection of these themes with digital and tech policy, an area where the EU is currently very active in setting new rules for the years to come. This is not only because this policy field was relatively less regulated than others, but also due to the strategic importance of technology in view of the dynamics that characterise the interconnected world economy. This is embodied in the concept of “technological sovereignty” (sometimes “digital sovereignty”), linked to one of the headline ambitions of the von der Leyen Commission (2019-2024), which is “A Europe fit for the digital age”.

Thus, two questions are in order. First, is the EU aware of the strategic importance of regulatory leadership in the digital field? Some of the most recent initiatives of the European Commission give a clear and positive answer to this question.

The European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, proposed by the Commission in January 2022, proclaims “the ambition that the principles serve as an inspiration for international partners to guide a digital transformation which puts people and their human rights at the centre throughout the world.”

In the Strategic Foresight Report 2021, the Commission writes that the EU is in competition for ‘first mover’ advantage in standard‑setting, particularly in emerging technologies – from Artificial Intelligence (AI) to blockchain, from quantum to digital currencies – and green technologies, such as hydrogen, energy storage, offshore wind and sustainable transport. The 2022 edition of the Report goes one step further: it makes an explicit link between the EU’s ability of setting international standards – where a more strategic approach must be developed – and the potential success of the EU’s economy to move towards an economic model of “competitive sustainability” – one that is embedded in the values of fairness and sustainability and at the same time capable of delivering economic stability and productivity.

Similarly, in the EU Strategy on Standardisation, the Commission recognises the strategic importance of norms and standard setting, it recognises that the EU is lagging behind in this field and sets out the actions to close the gap. In line with the paradigm to remain open, the way forward is identified in multilateralism and alliance with likeminded partners. A concrete example of this approach is represented by the work under the new format of Trade and Technology Council recently launched with the United States and India, as well as the newly-established Digital Partnerships with Japan and South Korea, lready planned also with Singapore.

Particular attention to cooperation in digital policy with likeminded third countries can be found, for instance, in the Note on Regulation of the EU Digital Economy drafted by the current Trio Presidency (France, Czech Republic, and Sweden). Thus, Member States, which at the moment are fundamental drivers of EU policymaking, appear to be well-aware of the opportunities and responsibilities associated with open regulatory leadership. Also in the European Parliament, the other co-legislator, the implications of the Brussels Effect come up in many debates around digital policymaking. Just to cite one example, the European Parliament’s Report on artificial intelligence in a digital age “acknowledges that establishing the world’s first regulatory framework for AI could give the EU leverage and a first-mover advantage in setting international AI standards based on fundamental rights as well as successfully exporting human-centric, ‘trustworthy AI’ around the world.”

Having acknowledged that EU institutions are aware of how crucial it is for the EU to practice open regulatory leadership, the second question to be addressed is the following: what is the EU doing to achieve it? In other words, does the “Brussels Effect” in digital policy truly exist and is it proactively used as an instrument to support the open strategic autonomy objectives?

The term “Brussels Effect” synthesises different explanations for the EU’s unique ability to influence rules in third countries. Supposedly, by virtue of its market size, regulatory capacity and stringent regulation on specific markets and targets, the EU exerts its influence both de jure – third countries emulate EU regulations domestically – and de facto – multinational companies abide by EU rules even when subject to other jurisdictions.

An article recently published by Digital Society explores the issue in relation to data protection rules, in an attempt to answer the question of why and how the EU rules global digital policy. Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was passed in 2016, it has been commonly defined as the “gold standard” data protection law and has become the paramount example of EU regulation in the digital field holding a truly global reach. Empirical evidence collected through qualitative interviews with 40 policymakers, stakeholders, and experts around the world shows that EU rules in data protection have a sizeable international impact. Among the several potential enablers of EU regulatory influence, the main drivers of the GDPR’s global success are the EU’s internal market appeal, its credibility as a regulator, and the timing of its regulatory actions in line with evolving policy needs.

This has empowered the EU to exert regulatory influence in a unilateral and indirect way, with private companies complying to the GDPR even when not obliged to do so and third countries freely choosing to emulate the European approach in their own system, either due to economic considerations or the desire to imitate a model that is considered good for human rights or effective to deal with technological developments. The EU has been exerting regulatory influence also in a more proactive and direct manner, via Commission decisions that enable the free flow of data whenever a third country is deemed to provide an adequate level of data protection in line with European standards.

As European legislators are now discussing how to regulate Artificial Intelligence, the Centre for the Governance of AI published a research paper that focuses on the potential for these new rules to diffuse globally and produce a “Brussels Effect” in AI policy. The authors conclude that parts of the new EU regulatory regime are likely to generate a de facto Brussels Effect, incentivising changes in products offered in non-EU countries. The paper also argues that there is a strong possibility that EU AI rules will influence regulation adopted by other jurisdictions, de jure diffusion being particularly likely for jurisdictions with significant trade relations with the EU. Furthermore, the upcoming regulation might be particularly important in offering the first and most influential operationalisation of what it means to develop and deploy trustworthy and human-centred AI.

Learning from the lessons of the GDPR, other countries have already started moving on this front in order not to be left behind. In October 2022, the United States, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy released a “Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights”, which provides a non-binding framework for how government, technology companies, and citizens can work together to ensure more accountable AI. Also China has become increasingly keen on the “ethics” of technology, with a number of initiatives on AI, data and privacy governance. It must be said that both the US and the Chinese approach to digital regulation differs, to different degrees, from the European one. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the present discussion, what matters here is the simple fact that policymakers in other parts of the world address issue of tech governance adopting some of the categories (such as ethics, accountability, trustworthiness) championed by the EU.

To conclude, if the EU wants to remain a relevant actor in the multipolar world, it ought to employ all the soft power tools at its disposal. This is even more true in the digital field, as the most powerful players in digital markets are not European. In order to have success in this endeavour, it is necessary to maintain an open approach towards international likeminded partners and to meaningfully engage with market players, as they are key in the realisation of the de facto Brussels Effect.

However, we must beware of the idea that regulatory leadership alone is sufficient to achieve the objectives of open strategic autonomy. Regulatory leadership must be accompanied by – or better, fully integrated in – a truly European foreign policy, of which it can become a powerful tool (thus marking a stark difference from the classic instrument of nation states, that is military might). Moreover, while there might be appetite for regulatory solutions in response to the need of digital sovereignty also in other world regions – we can think to South America and South-East Asia and their dependence to the respective regional powers – the EU will be really able to exert open regulatory leadership only if its regulatory model is successful in practice. In other words, it is fundamental that the EU regulatory model enables the actual implementation of technological solutions. An active EU role in the development of technical standards, attention to innovation, and the meaningful engagement of industry players in the regulatory process are essential for the success of technological implementation in the European way.

Therefore, open regulatory leadership represents a decisive tool in the European policymaking on the global stage, starting from the digital sphere. Furthermore, it can be the practical application of the concept of “open federation”, presented in the opening article of this Journal (Ventotene still inspires us), which calls for making the EU a model to be followed on the path towards a world federation.

*A partnership The Ventotene Lighthouse / Eurobull

Italian version at https://www.eurobull.it/essere-giovani-in-europa-quale-futuro?lang=fr

The world is changing, visibly and dramatically. The floods which hit Central Europe in July – the last in a long series of disasters – glaringly highlighted the unpredictable consequences of climate change, which is now giving rise to increasingly perilous, abrupt and chaotic meteorological phenomena.

The situation appears to be constantly escalating. The climate system is at breaking point and any efforts being made to address the situation tend to feel like attempting to bail out a sinking ship: the water is pouring in faster than we can empty it.

The world is changing, and this is nothing new. But a rational, strategic approach to climate change, based on a long-term vision of the future, would be entirely new. Those who will have to live with the consequences of climate change are not the past generation, those who enjoyed the so-called “Economic Boom”, or those – in Europe and North America – who reaped the benefits of it during the 60s and the 70s. The new generations are those which will be trapped by the consequences of politics focused on an eternal present, and lacking the imagination to face the future.

The youngest generations, and those as yet unborn, will be living in a more and more urbanized world, with rising temperatures and without the necessary resources for their survival. These young people will need to be able to count on new political, social and economic structures, and innovative institutional systems, to tackle challenges that will otherwise be insurmountable.

The process of European unification arose and developed around the idea of ushering in a new era of peace, after the horrors of the two World Wars. But this idea is no longer enough: the Union now has to take responsibility, and it is a huge responsibility, for building a new and different future for its younger generations. And not just for them alone, because the challenges involved go beyond continental and national borders. The European Union seems better equipped than other political players to bring a considerable number of  industrialized nations into line with the new principles of sustainable development – in both economic and ecological terms.

But do young people trust the European Union? As an institution it is often viewed as a distant, bureaucratic body. An organization that issues diktats from the glass palaces of Brussels, and sometimes appears to be uncertain of its identity. The recent COVID pandemic has highlighted its cracks, flaws and slow response times.

Brexit placed a heavy toll on the unity of the EU, but did not lead to the break down envisaged by the opponents of the integration process. At the same time, the attitude of Poland and Hungary towards the “rule of law” represents a new challenge to the primacy of European law over national systems.

But if the European Union has to answer to anyone in particular, that must necessarily be its younger inhabitants. We thought it would be useful to take a little survey, with the limited means at our disposal, to explore how young Italians – with or without experience of living in the rest of Europe – feel about the EU, this institution that increasingly appears to be viewed as vital to building a better future for everyone.

Ours was not an exhaustive sample. We prepared a set of questions which we then sent to various young people, and we were able to extrapolate some considerations from their responses.

One of the most significant findings was the percentage of young people who state that they  feel European – 50% of the sample – and those who confirm that it makes sense to feel European, 93.8%. If almost all respondents acknowledge that this sense of belonging is meaningful, and highlight its importance, why are some of them not feeling it?

From this perspective, the accounts of our respondents offer precious insights. Eleonora, 27, and with a degree in sociology, writes “I think the reason I don’t feel European is to do with the fact that I have never lived in another country”. Indeed all those who have lived abroad feel European. It goes without saying that when you cross a border, it is impossible not to perceive the existence of the European Union. Programmes like Erasmus have been essential in developing a common European sentiment among participants. But though it is  a fundamental initiative that must be supported and promoted, it remains an opportunity that only a tiny minority of young people have access to.

So what stops young people from feeling European? We can summarize the answers provided in three main categories. Some respondents stated that the European Union does not really care about its citizens or does not care enough: some are sceptical about it being possible to bridge the gap between Brussels and their local area, and the third category comprises those who, while believing in the values expressed by the EU, find it hard to see actual results.

Despite these responses, even the doubters see the European Union as a source of hope: 81.3% of those surveyed see it as the organization best equipped to address the challenges and priorities of the present day. The remaining percentage ticked “I don’t know”. There is therefore hope, and a clear awareness that such issues can only be handled on a European level.

Our respondents also showed great interest in the policies that will affect their future. As is natural for this generation – destined by birth to take charge of the planet in the near future – the key issue, regardless of personal politics, remains what the future holds; how to achieve economic stability and how to respond to the major ecological, economic and social challenges we are currently facing.

In short, young people are calling for change. But the European Union is by no means unresponsive. Not incidentally, the goals that must be pursued by member states when using “Next Generation EU” funding are entirely in line with the priorities expressed by our respondents.

Young people’s differing stances towards the European Union are probably due to different constructions of meaning, contrary to what might be expected. For all under 30s, the EU is the container they live in, and create and live out their dreams and aspirations. More importantly, it is the container in which they will have to face the great challenges of the 21^st century. There can be no discussions about the future without considering the European Union, without a discussion on its role, and undoubtedly without an EU capable of living up to young people’s expectations. Initiatives like “Next Generation EU” are clear signals in this direction. The EU is doing everything in its power to place the younger generations at the centre of the political agenda.

At this point, maybe we should be asking ourselves what nation-states should be doing: sharing more of their sovereignty with the Union and endowing it with a broader scope for action, given that young people see it as the institution best equipped to tackle the challenges of the future, with the capacity and the tools to respond to them?

The EU’s problems remain, in any case. Programmes like Erasmus, for example, often feel like they are destined only for the privileged few: those who can afford to go to university, in the first place and, in addition, can afford to live abroad, considering that the grants offered are rarely enough to cover all of students’ living expenses.

On one hand, therefore, the European Union is seen as a potential resource for facing the challenges of the future, but on the other it is viewed as a distant world, part of a different  system. This gap needs to be bridged in order to capture the existing needs of the new generations; there are already some potential solutions on the table but these are yet to be implemented.

It is certainly not the first time that young people have represented both a challenge and an asset for the European integration process. Tools like the European Social Fund, Interreg, and the European Structural and Investment Funds, as well as NGEU, have directed community efforts toward some of these challenges, including young people in considerable investments of resources. This is surely promising, though shortcomings remain in terms of communication.

Tools and programmes like those mentioned above are a step in the right direction, but to ensure that young people feel European, they not only need to be able to see Europe as a major federal political community, but also to guarantee that European institutions become an ally to tackle unemployment, the generational socio-economic gap, the ecological and climate crisis, and the very question of political representation.

What emerged from these interviews was the idea that a common future exists for the European “community”. A common future which is also the solution to the lack of political credibility currently affecting many national institutions.

                                                           POLICY PAPER

…Perhaps it is from Europe that the message for coexistence and cooperation between different peoples, religions, cultures and ideas can come, for a more united world….

1. A symbolic event

Should the measures to contain the Coronavirus pandemic allow it, the foundation stone for a temple that will combine a synagogue, a mosque and a Christian church in one building complex will be laid in Berlin before the summer of 2021. The idea dates back to 2009. Since then, a competition between Architect studios has been held and a winning project has been selected, which envisages a large central entrance and meeting space from which one has access to three separate but united spaces for prayer and meditation following the three monotheistic religions that have dominated the history of Europe for more than two millennia.

This event is bound to have great symbolic value, as religious beliefs in Europe have been a powerful factor of divisions and conflicts, between and within religions. The ecumenical movement has made considerable progress in recent decades, but the presence of a single temple where believers of different faiths can together, and at the same time each on their own, pray and celebrate their rites, is an event deemed to have great symbolic value, perhaps, we hope, marking a turning point not only for Europe, but for the whole world.

If we gave ourselves the task of arousing some form of “European nationalism” we would have no difficulty in recalling many elements in the history of the last 2-3 thousand years that make Europe, as we rhetorically say, a “beacon of civilization”. This is not the task we want to undertake. Rather, we want to shed light on those aspects for which Europe is, and has been, a negative example and in respect of which Europe can, perhaps, today, show the way to overcome them.

• Religious wars

One of these aspects is certainly identifiable in the long history of religious wars. A history that starts from far away, at least from the events of the successive destructions and reconstructions of the temple of Jerusalem, from the history of the crusades to terrorism, and the attack on the Twin Towers that marked the beginning of the third millennium. It is significant that the Berlin Temple provides for the meeting, together but distinct, of the three great monotheistic religions. All three postulate the belief in a single god, but his word is manifested through prophecies and therefore conflicts arise around the question of what is the “true” word of God. What they have in common, starting from the belief in a single god, has not prevented in certain phases of history and in certain areas of the world their more or less peaceful coexistence, but more often they have produced wars of unprecedented violence. According to Jan Assmann, one of the major scholars of the origins of monotheism, people who recognize themselves in their belief in one god inevitably give rise to conflict, to violence, because “my” god cannot be compatible with “your” god, there is only “one” truth.

The history of relations between Christians and Muslims, between Jews and Christians and between Jews and Muslims, even without adhering to the theory of the inevitable “clash of civilizations”, is more a history of wars than of peaceful coexistence.

Religious beliefs are undoubtedly a component of the identity of the peoples of the earth, they are a factor of inclusion and at the same time of exclusion and therefore they can be both causes and consequences of conflict. Conflicts of the most bitter kind, however, have developed within each monotheistic religions and even within those that have preached universal brotherhood.

In 1598, King Henry IV issued the Edict of Nantes, which put a temporary end to the war between Catholics and Huguenots (Calvinists) that had devastated France for almost half a century, recognizing freedom of worship and other rights. A little less than a century later, the edict was revoked, this time at Fontainebleau, by Louis XVI, reopening an issue that would be overcome only with the Revolution. The history of Germany in the seventeenth century is also characterized by religious wars between Catholic and Protestant states: estimates say that the Thirty Years’ War caused from 3 to 9 million deaths in a population estimated at 15 to 20 million. The war ended with the Peace of Westphalia that sanctioned, on the one hand, the definitive affirmation of the principle that subjects had to follow the religion of the prince who governed the territory (“cuius regio, eius religio”) and, on the other hand, sanctioned the principle of absolute sovereignty of the state, cancelling any claim of a superior imperial instance. Even today, in German-speaking regions, the territorial distribution of religious practices between Catholic and Protestant regions reflects that which was established at that time.

• The connection between religious and political conflicts

The wars of religion, as is evident, were not only motivated by religious reasons. In history, the relationship between religion and political power has passed through the most diverse configurations, ranging from coincidence, to commingling and mutual influence, to separation and mutual hostility. Sometimes it is the political power that uses religion for its own ends, sometimes it is the religious institutions that use the alliance with the political power to affirm and spread their faith.

One cannot fail to remember, for example, that the expansion of Christian religions, and in particular the influence of the Catholic Church, went hand in hand with colonial expansion of the European powers. Missionaries often accompanied or followed colonial armies, and many times the conversion of entire populations was forced and imposed at gunpoint. The memory of colonialism extends long after the era that marks its end and even today has left deep traces in relations, for example, between the West and the Islamic world.

If it can be said that the wars of religions in Europe ended with the Peace of Westphalia and that, with different times and forms from country to country, conditions of greater tolerance among the Christian religious denominations were affirmed in Europe, the history of anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism is by no means over, indeed it has had well-known dramatic developments throughout the 20th century and up to the present day.

Religious wars are not, however, a prerogative of Christian Europe. Even within Islam, armed conflicts of unprecedented violence have been fought, and are still being fought today. For example the war between Iran and Iraq from 2002 to 2011 that reopened ancient hostilities between Shiites and Sunnis dating back to the time of Muhammad’s succession, or even the war between Yemen and Saudi Arabia where religious motives, though not dominating, are certainly not absent. There have been no real religious wars within Judaism, due to the dispersion in the diaspora in scattered communities. The scattered diffusion has meant that sometimes followers of the Jewish religion belonging to states at war with each other have found themselves having to fight against their co-religionists. Nonetheless, tensions between orthodox, reformer and nonbeliever Jews are quite frequent in the state of Israel, where however the conflict with the Palestinian population of Islamic faith is the prominent trait.

There are not only monotheistic religions in the world. In Eastern religions we find polytheistic variants (for example, in Hinduism) and animistic and spiritualistic religions, such as Buddhism and Shintoism. Significantly, it has been predominantly contacts with peoples of monotheistic religions that have generated religious conflicts with religions of the East, although there is no shortage of examples, as recently in Sri Lanka, of conflicts between peoples of Buddhist (Sinhalese) and Hindu (Tamil) faiths.

• Believers and non-believers

Since Europe has been the real theatre of religious wars, it is to be hoped that the new temple in Berlin may symbolically signify their end and at the same time the beginning of a new era in which the different religious faiths can coexist in mutual respect, but also in a non-hostile relationship and dialogue with the great mass of those who do not believe.

Europe, together with China and Japan, has the highest percentage of atheists and agnostics in the world. Many studies have tried to explain the reasons for the eclipse of the sacred, or the rise of the process of secularization, in modern and contemporary Europe. Some trace the disenchantment with religion in Europe back to the cultural currents from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, from the spread of scientific thought to the emergence of nineteenth- and twentieth-century ideologies (liberalism, Marxism, nationalism) as functional substitutes for religion, as secular faiths. Secularization would be an aspect of modernity. These theses, however, encounter a difficulty in explaining how the process has not reached in particular the United States, which, in many respects, seems to be an extreme example of modernity.

In a Gallup survey in 2009, the population of 150 countries around the world was asked whether they attributed importance to religion (“Is religion important in your daily life?”), and all the countries in which negative responses exceeded positive ones were, with few exceptions, European or Asian countries (Japan, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Cuba, Canada, South Korea, and Taiwan). The only European countries where “yes” responses prevail are, in the order of frequency of positive responses, Ireland, Austria, Croatia, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Poland. With the exception of Greece, all the European countries where “secularized” orientations are in the minority are countries of Catholic tradition. It should be noted that in other Catholic countries like Spain, those who do not give importance to religion in their daily lives prevail only by a small margin. More recent research conducted within the EU by Euro-barometer confirms more or less the same picture.

The United States ranks just behind Austria and ahead of Croatia, thus, compared to Europe, among the countries with higher levels of religiosity. Scholars have wondered whether the anomaly is widespread European secularization, or the persistent religiosity of the United States. Religious pluralism, in a situation where there has never been a “state religion” and, on the contrary, where the separation between the two powers, secular and religious, has been established from the beginning, are factors that have undoubtedly contributed to the spread of tolerant attitudes towards those who believe and practice a faith different from one’s own. However there have been in the United States, especially in recent times, strong anti-Islamic movements and sporadic episodes of anti-Semitism.

From the religious point of view there is no doubt that pluralism significantly favors peaceful coexistence among different kinds of believers.

The panorama of religiosity in Europe, however, does not only concern the plurality of the faiths present, but also the great diversity of ways of approaching faith and practicing it. It is one thing to believe in God, quite another to believe that this belief is relevant to one’s daily life, and quite another to assiduously follow the prescriptions that religious practice entails (for example, attendance at Sunday Mass). Then there are those who do not believe in a specific divinity but recognize in themselves some form of spirituality, those who deny the existence of any divine/transcendent entity and finally those who are completely indifferent to religious issues.

For Christians, Mass attendance in Europe varies from countries where about a third of the population regularly attends Sunday services (Ireland, Poland and Italy), to countries where it is around a quarter to a fifth (Austria, Spain, Greece) and all other countries where it is less than 10%. The share of those who are and/or declare themselves to be atheists or agnostics also varies greatly. The line between atheism and agnosticism is difficult to draw, both conceptually and in the consciousness of individuals. Atheists are those who deny the existence of God and of any divinity, agnostics are those who claim that there is no proof that God exists or does not exist, but often believe in the existence of a dimension of the spirit that does not take divine form. Approximately one European citizen out of four belongs to these last two categories, with great variability from country to country: half of the Swedes, 40% of the French, 1/3 of the British, but only 13% of the Italians and 3.5% of the Greeks. Atheists and agnostics, however, are not to be confused with those for whom religion has no relevance to their daily lives, that is, with those who are indifferent to the religious dimension. Rather, the indifferent lurk among those, whether believers or non-believers, for whom religion is in any case irrelevant. Indifferent people cannot be counted on even in an ecumenical perspective, while dialogue is possible among atheists, agnostics and believers.

A very promising anticipation in this direction was the inauguration in 1987 in Milan of the “chair of non-believers” by Cardinal Martini, who expressed himself as follows on that occasion:

‘I believe that each one of us has within himself a non-believer and a believer, who talk to each other inside, question each other, continually send pungent and disturbing questions back to each other. The non-believer who is in me troubles the believer who is in me and vice versa’.

The fact of not believing in the existence of god or gods (atheist), or of not finding any reason to affirm the existence or non-existence of god or gods (agnostic) does not mean that those who belong to these two categories do not ask themselves what the meaning of life is, by what criteria we distinguish good from evil, why suffering is distributed unequally among living beings, where we come from (who was there before us?) and where we are going (who will be there after us?). These are all questions with respect to which human societies have often sought answers in religion.

Ecumenism is therefore not only a current of thought that promotes dialogue between different faiths, but also between believers and non-believers.

5.         Modern Science and Religion

It is true that religions have often been used to establish, reinforce and legitimize power relationships between the dominant and the dominated. There is a long tradition in European culture, from the Enlightenment to Marx and Nietzsche, that thinks of religions as forms of superstition, as “opium of the people”, but there are others that see religion as a factor of redemption and emancipation.

In Europe, the relationship between science and religion, between scientists and doctors of the Church has always been, to say the least, problematic. Everyone remembers the trial of Galileo, the controversies around the Copernican concept and the diatribes between heliocentrism and geo-centrism, the rejection of Darwinian theories of evolution and, more recently, the disputes around stem cell research and the end of life. The list could be lengthened at will. Science has certainly challenged and refuted many religious beliefs, but this does not sanction an irreducible incompatibility between science and religion.

Empirical research data tells us that scientists are one of the categories in which atheism and agnosticism prevail, yet there are many who do not consider religious faith incompatible with trust in science. These people believe, in my opinion correctly, that science is not able to answer all the questions to which religions, in historically different ways, have tried to give an answer. It is true that there are also those who have transformed Science, with a capital S, into a faith, who “believe” in Science. But often they are not real scientists. True scientists know the limits, the fallibility, the provisionality, the incompleteness, of scientific knowledge: they have confidence in science rather than faith in science. Those who want certainty are better off going to church, not to a laboratory. Science is a path of approach to a truth that can never be reached, on the contrary, the progress of knowledge continuously discovers realities (both in the extremely small and in the extremely large, both in the field of physics and psychology) which we were previously oblivious of, so science continually makes us aware of how ignorant we are. Think of quantum physics that allows us to cast a glance into the immensity of the cosmos or psychoanalysis that allows us, again, to cast only a glance into the depths of the unconscious.

6.         Conclusion

During the recent pandemic, policy makers have often hidden behind the supposedly objective judgment of science, but since science is never able to give absolute certainty and scientists themselves cannot often reach the same conclusions, people have begun to doubt, and trust in science and scientists has begun to be questioned. Even the “faith in science”, as well as the great ideologies that claimed to have an answer for all problems, have undergone the same process that happened to the great religions, they have been partially “secularized”.  But it is precisely because certainties have disappeared that dialogue between religions and between believers and non-believers has become not only possible, but also desirable. Dialogue is difficult among those who claim to have the “truth” while it is promising for those who only have the will to seek it. 

Europe has been the place where some of the most atrocious conflicts in the history of mankind have been fought, from religious wars to wars between nations and wars between ideologies. Perhaps it is from Europe that the message for coexistence and cooperation between different peoples, religions, cultures and ideas can come, for a more united world.

At the time of the discussions on the Treaty for a European Constitution (2003-2005) it was proposed to include in the preamble a reference to the “Christian roots of Europe”, arousing lively reactions from the representatives of millions of Muslims living in Europe as citizens of member states and the Jewish minority who survived the Holocaust and did not emigrate to Israel or America. In the end, a compromise was reached indicating “the cultural, religious and humanistic heritage of Europe.” As is well known, after the French and Dutch referendums, the Constituent Treaty was archived and replaced by the Treaty of  Lisbon which includes the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union where reference is made to the “spiritual and moral heritage” without expressly mentioning the religious dimension.

1. Young people and their future – The global reach of the “Fridays for Future” movement has brought the environmental crisis to the attention of public opinion and international politics. Since Only One Earth, the conference held in Stockholm in 1972, the United Nations has been warning national governments about the risks of the destruction of the environment. Scientific studies on ecological systems and their possible collapse have increased exponentially in the meantime, from the research regarding the hole in the ozone layer to more recent reports on global warming and the mass extinction of animal species. Yet little or nothing has actually been done, despite the fact that the deadly effects of the environmental crisis are now evident. Pressure on national governments must be increased, with effective action on a global scale.

            “Fridays for Future” initially asked governments to heed scientists’ warnings. It was no use: the inaction continues. Now civil disobedience protests are being planned, similar to the type of action pursued by “Extinction Rebellion”. Yet rebellion is just the beginning of political action. There has to be a strategy based on achieving a specific aim. A global problem calls for global solutions.

2. The Anthropocene century – In the year 2000, a group of scientists came together to address the issue of the changes taking place in the geological epoch known as the “Holocene”. Paul Crutzen, winner of the Nobel Prize for Chemistry, interrupted the meeting with the admonishment, “Stop saying the Holocene! We’re not in the Holocene any more”. Crutzen’s point was that the changes under way were being caused by humans, not nature, and the name he came up with to convey this was the Anthropocene. Indeed the Anthropocene is the epoch in which the future of life on the planet now hinges on human action, or inaction. This term has become a cultural paradigm, explored by natural scientists, social scientists and philosophers alike. The Indian historian Dipesch Chakrabarty notes that we can no longer write the history of humanity, as has always been done, as distinct from natural history. From now on, history must be written framing the human species as part of the history of other living species. Darwin himself highlighted this connection. The human species is not exempt from the risk of extinction; it is not immortal.

            Politics needs to embrace this point of view too. The political subject of the twenty-first century is no longer a class, a state, a group of states or a dominant culture; it is the whole of humanity. Those who want to be in politics have to come up with initiatives, economic, social and institutional reforms that will enable humanity to plan its own future. This new humanism is based on a notion of civilisation that rejects all those who, still today, are guided by Nazism/Fascism and racism. There can never be another Auschwitz. Today, those in politics must think and act like citizens of the world.

3. Sustainable development – With the publication of the “Brundtland Report” in 1987 –  which defines sustainable development as development that “meets the needs of present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own  needs” – it finally seemed that it would be possible to come to an agreement within the framework of the United Nations to address the environmental challenge. Yet crucial difficulties soon arose. The technologies for removing greenhouse gases were not yet mature, and using them would have led to a significant increase in production costs for some industries. Secondly, the gap between rich and poor countries became evident. The costs of cleaning up pollution could not simply be divided by population on a per-capita basis: emerging countries had no intention of paying the price for the environmental destruction that the polluting industrialized countries had caused in the past. Lastly, the threat of the sixth extinction of living species had increased exponentially, but it was not clear what should be done to protect the surviving biodiversity.

            Yet these issues do not justify the continuous postponement of decisive global solutions. The political crux of the problem, which supporters and opponents of sustainable development overlook, is the fact that humanity is divided into sovereign nation states.  The international system, also known as the Westphalia system, is founded «on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members» (Art. 2, UN Charter). The Westphalia system survived the French Revolution: it is the dogma upheld by every national government. At all the UN conferences on environmental issues, a unanimous decision therefore has to be reached between 193 “equally sovereign” countries. The consequence has been a lot of buck-passing, i.e. countries continuing to postpone the measures required to “meet the needs of future generations”. In democratic countries, electoral terms last four or five years. It is therefore in the interests of all governments to pass on the costs of cleaning up pollution to subsequent administrations, and let them be shouldered by future generations. Today young people have realized that their future might consist in gradually suffocating to death on a desertified planet. This buck-passing policy has to end. Even those living in undemocratic or authoritarian countries are aware of this. The future of humanity cannot be conditioned by the existence of borders, be they geographical or political.

4. What can be done? – In 2015, all of the UN member states approved the “Sustainable Development Goals” (SDGs). The 17 goals represent a coherent set of policies that could set humanity on a path to sustainable development. Yet the UN does not have any instruments of government it can use to persuade the “equally sovereign” countries to adopt the policies needed to implement the plan. What is needed is for at least the continent-size countries – members of the G20 – to agree to entrust the UN with some powers of government, as its Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, asked when the pandemic broke out. Guterres wanted the IMF to issue Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a global quasi-currency, to help poor countries in difficulty and reinforce the WHO. This could be accompanied by the creation of a UN budget financed with a levy on the major multinational companies that currently hide their profits in tax havens. With these resources at its disposal, the UN would be in a position to launch a World Green Deal.

            If we want to stop passing the burden to future generations, we need to endow the UN with limited but effective powers. Every country would benefit from a plan for the sustainable development of the planet (SDGs). A political community cannot exist if it does not accept a government or governance, that is, a peaceful but binding system of coordination, to ensure that collective decisions, reached democratically, can be enforced. International democratic cooperation is not an unrealistic utopia; it is a necessity. The European Union has already taken steps in this direction. Global governance, and peaceful cooperation between UN members, is possible.

            What happens in the twenty-first century will decide whether humanity has a future. While some visionaries are looking into colonizing other planets, it is worth remembering that Planet Earth is the common home that we cannot destroy. Civil disobedience will only be effective if it combines protests against the malgovernment of the planet with proposals for a peaceful global governance.

For a strong Child Guarantee and a Next Generations EU fund for Europe’s future generations

Within the European Union, even before the pandemic, 23 million children were at risk of poverty and social exclusion. The financial difficulties endured by European families due to Covid-19 as well as the disruption in early childhood education and care (ECEC) services have further strained an already perilous situation. 

That is why over 300 prominent figures from the world of politics, academia and civil society that have already signed this call.and invites you to join this call for a Child Union built on three objectives: 

1. A rapid entry into force of the European Child Guarantee
2. The development of an investments ecosystem for European children starting with a correct planning of the Next Generation EU funding
3. Guaranteed equal access to quality and inclusive early childhood education and care for all

You can sign this Call below and share the link with your network! The call is available in different languages on the website of PES group Committee of the Regions.

The Ventotene Lighthouse also invites you to sign this Call.

The Call

Within the borders of the European Union, already before the pandemic, 23 million children were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. The financial difficulties endured by European families in this period as well as the disruption in educational and care services have added additional strain to an already worrisome situation. The public health restrictions brought about by the pandemic have made it hard for many to keep up with their education, leading some to drop out of school altogether. The inability to socialise with their peers has impacted children’s mental health. The consequences have been very unequal depending on socio-economic background, even as poverty has worsened.

The impact of the pandemic on children’s inequalities is uneven and alarming. For this reason, we call for a renewed effort of European Institutions towards attaining a Child Union, a union that guarantees equal opportunities to all children, and a prompt action to deliver on the Child Guarantee and on a Next Generation EU that truly works for Europe’s next generations.

There are little doubts that the fragility of Europe is the result of increased inequalities and a protracted undermining of welfare, which have made our society more vulnerable to economic, environmental, and, as we have seen, health crises.

Our children are the key to building more just and sustainable societies. Overwhelming evidence shows that inequalities in life chances are already formed in the early years of life and are largely passed on through generations. At present, many families with young children are without adequate support, and only half of EU member states have reached the EU objective of a 33% coverage for early childhood education and care (ECEC) below the age of 3.

The figures that EUROSTAT provides would be worrying even without the COVID-19 effect. In 9 countries, less than 1 out of 5 children enjoys childcare, and that is usually the one from a better off household. It is in fact worrisome that the take up of ECEC services is much lower among children from disadvantaged families, children with special needs, low income households and people living in rural and remote areas.

The figures that EUROSTAT provides would be worrying even without the COVID-19 effect. In 9 countries, less than 1 out of 5 children enjoys childcare, and that is usually the one from a better off household. It is in fact worrisome that the take up of ECEC services is much lower among children from disadvantaged families, children with special needs, low income households and people living in rural and remote areas.

In some countries less than 20% of these children are part of any kind of ECEC, compared to more than 70% among the top income households. A study led by FEPS and partners finds that European 0 to 3 years old children from the bottom 40% socio-economic status are about 15% more likely to attain average scores once teenagers, if they have access  to childcare at the age of 1 or 2. The study highlights that welfare provisions do impact children’s later education outcomes, whereas for instance where women’s employment rate are above the EU average and where both parents are eligible for parental leave, children from disadvantaged households can more easily achieve good educational results.  

This indicates that unless we provide quality and inclusive services, care and education in early years in Europe remains a means for children from better off households to achieve their best potential rather than a means to reduce inequalities and eradicate social exclusion. 

As progressives, we demand a systemic transformation: the end of ECEC as demand-driven service and the beginning of an era where it is an entitlement for every child. A legal and social right enshrined in European law, building on the European Pillar of Social Rights. 

The EU possesses the capacity for policy innovation and the political strength to facilitate a new era of support and development for all European children and to address such very stubborn trends of inequality. To this end, as progressive leaders, scholars and activists from across Europe, our vision for a Child Union is grounded on the following objectives: 

1. A rapid entry into force of the European Child Guarantee.

Many members of the European Parliament and the whole progressive family have called for a European Child Guarantee to tackle the multidimensional aspects of child poverty.

The Child Guarantee would ensure that every European child in or at risk of poverty has access to quality and free early childcare, along with health care, education, decent housing, and adequate nutrition. Negotiations are ongoing and all efforts must be made to ensure that the Child Guarantee becomes an integral part of EU policy. This includes a dedicated budget of 20 billion Euros and binding financing commitments for the Member States in their ESF+ national programmes. 

2. Develop an investments ecosystem for European children starting with a correct planning of the Next Generation EU funding. 

With children bearing the brunt of so much of the pandemic’s blows, the Child Union should become a fundamental pillar in Europe’s recovery strategy. This requires re-calibrating National Recovery Plans towards the care services of Europe’s future generations. 

An investment ecosystem for European children should build on the Child Guarantee, the Recovery and Resilience Facility, Structural Funds and national resources to enhance the effective delivery of quality and inclusive ECEC services for all, with a special focus on the most vulnerable children and families. 

3. Guarantee equal access to quality and inclusive early childhood education and care for all. 

European law should ensure child rights and legal entitlements with universal and affordable public provisions for all and dedicated resources for disadvantaged and at-risk children. Promoting quality and inclusiveness are key priorities. This involves: i) providing teachers with decent salaries and training to equip Europe’s next generation with the 21st century skills they need to succeed; ii) strengthening children’s emancipation and their role as agents of change; iii) facilitating the involvement and participation of parents and communities; iv) capitalizing on the synergies that ECEC has with social protection and labour policies. In fact, to tackle structural inequalities as risk factors for children’s development, income support measures for children, active labour market policies, particularly for female employment; decent minimum wages guaranteed by law or collective bargaining, and adequate gender-neutral parental leaves are decisive.

The COVID-19 pandemic has posed new and dramatic challenges to vulnerable households. As experts, activists and policymakers we think that it is time to raise Europe’s ambitions and put forward this strong call for a Child Union. This expresses the demand to the EU to raise to the expectations of its citizens and ensure wellbeing not only through Banking Union, Capital Markets Union, Energy Union and other economic cooperation, but through a Social Union that has a strong mandate on the wellbeing of every child.

EUROPEAN POLICYMAKERS

Brando Benifei, Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur on the European Child Guarantee and President of the Spinelli Group

Agnes Jongerius, Member of the European Parliament, Chair of the PES Social Europe Network

Victor Negrescu, Member of the European Parliament, Rapporteur on the EU digital education strategy

Marc Tarabella, Member of the European Parliament and Mayor of Anthisnes

Sergei Stanishev, President of the Party of European Socialists

Iratxe Garcia Perez, President of the S&D Group and Member of the European Parliament

Zita Gurmai, Member of the Hungarian Parliament and President of PES Women

Christophe Rouillon, President of the PES Group in the European Committee of the Regions, Vice-President of the Association of French Mayors and Mayor of Coulaines

Maria João Rodrigues, President of FEPS and Chair of the PES Economic and Financial Network

László Andor, Secretary General of FEPS and former European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusiveness

Klára Dorev, Vice President of the European Parliament, S&D Group

Alicia Homs, Member of the European Parliament and President of the Young European Socialists

Margarida Marques, Member of the European Parliament

Udo Bullmann, Member of the European Parliament

Elisabetta Gualmini, Member of the European Parliament

Estrella Dura Ferrandis, Member of the European Parliament

Massimiliano Smeriglio, Member of the European Parliament

Tonino Picula, Member of the European Parliament

Pau Mari Klose, Member of the Spanish Parliament 

Sylvie Guillaume, Member of the European Parliament

Ibán García del Blanco, Member of the European Parliament

Josianne Cutajar,  Member of the European Parliament

Rovana Plumb, Member of the European Parliament

Aurore Lalucq, Member of the European Parliament

Carmen Gabriela Avram, Member of the European Parliament

Csaba Molnár, Member of the European Parliament

Sándor Rónai, Member of the European Parliament

Attila Ara-Kovács, Member of the European Parliament

Isabel Carvalhais, Member of the European Parliament 

Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Member of the European Parliament 

Tanja Fajon, Member of the European Parliament

Eva Kaili, Member of the European Parliament

Monika Beňová, Member of European Parliament and Quaestor

Juozas Olekas, Member of the European Parliament

Cyrus Engerer, Member of the European Parliament

Costas Mavrides, Member of the European Parliament

Isabel Carvalhais, Member of the European Parliament

Isabel Coelho Santos, Member of the European Parliament

Pedro Marques, Member of the European Parliament

Javier Moreno Sánchez, Member of the European Parliament

Paul Tang, Member of the European Parliament

István Ujhelyi, Member of the European Parliament

Alex Agius Saliba, Member of the European Parliament

Domènec Ruiz Devesa, Member of the European Parliament

Mohammed Chahim, Member of the European Parliament

Patrizia Toia, Member of the European Parliament

Alessandra Moretti, Member of the European Parliament

Pina Picierno, Member of the European Parliament

Heléne Fritzon, Member of the European Parliament

Caterina Chinnici, Member of the European Parliament 

Tsvetelina Penkova, Member of the European Parliament

Romana Jerković, Member of the European Parliament

Clara Aguilera, Member of the European Parliament

César Luena, Member of the European Parliament

Javi López, Member of the European Parliament

Nora Mebarek, Member of the European Parliament

Gabriele Bischoff, Member of the European Parliament

Miapetra Kumpula-Natri, Member of the European Parliament

Adriana Maldonado, Member of the European Parliament

Carlos Zorrinho,Member of the European Parliament

Evelyn Regner, Member of the European Parliament

Predrag Fred Matić, Member of the European Parliament

Csaba Molnár, Member of the European Parliament

Bettina Vollath, Member of the European Parliament

Adrian-Dragos Benea, Member of the European Parliament

Manuel Pizarro, Member of the European Parliament

Biljana Borzan, Member of the European Parliament

Demetris Papadakis, Member of the European Parliament

Nils Usakovs, Member of the European Parliament

Andreas Schieder, Member of the European Parliament

Petra Kammerevert, Member of the European Parliament

Milan Brglez, Member of the European Parliament

Ismail Ertug, Member of the European Parliament

Mònica Silvana González, Member of the European Parliament

Cristina Maestre, Member of the European Parliament

Isabel Garcia Munoz, Member of the European Parliament

Maria-Manuel Leitão-Marques, Member of the European Parliament

Miroslav Číž, Member of the European Parliament

Eric Andrieu, Member of the European Parliament

Hannes Heide, Member of the European Parliament

Roby Biwer, Vice President, European Committee of the Regions and Member of Bettembourg Municipal Council

Enrique Barón Crespo, President of FEPS Scientific Council and former President of the European Parliament

Ana Pirtskhalava, Secretary General of the Young European Socialists

Elisha Winckel, Vice President of the Young European Socialists

Sara Costa, Vice President of the Young European Socialists

Chiara Malagodi, Deputy Secretary-General, PES Group in the European Committee of the Regions

Christina Schauer, President, International Falcon Movement – Socialist Educational International (IFM-SEI)

Ellen Lindsey Awuku, Vice President, IFM-SEI

Jasmin Trogen, Presidium member, IFM-SEI

Ruba Hilal, Secretary-General, International Falcon Movement – Socialist Educational International (IFM-SEI)

NATIONAL POLICYMAKERS

Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, Former President of Malta and President Eurochild 

Concepción Andreu Rodríguez, President of La Rioja Region and Vice President of the PES Group in the European Committee of the Regions

Elio Di Rupo, Minister-President of Wallonia and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Rudi Vervoort, Minister-President of the Brussels-Capital Region and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Paul Magnette, President of the Belgian Parti Socialiste and Mayor of Charleroi

Karl-Heinz Lambertz, President of the Parliament of the German-Speaking Community of Belgium and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Sandra Zampa, Undersecretary of State, Italian Ministry of Health

Pascal Smet, Secretary of State of the Brussels-Capital Region, responsible for Urbanism and Heritage, European and International Relations, Foreign Trade and Fire fighting and Emergency medical Assistance, Government of the Brussels Capital Region and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Celso González, Regional Minister for Finance and Public Administrations, Government of La Rioja and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Fernando Medina, Mayor of Lisbon and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Juan Espadas Cejas, Mayor of Sevilla and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Rachid Madrane, Président du Parlement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale 

Antonio Mazzeo, President, Regional Council of Tuscany 

Virginio Merola, Mayor of Bologna and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Kata Tüttő, Deputy Mayor of Budapest and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Arianna Censi, Deputy Mayor of the Metropolitan City of Milan and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Karin Wanngård, Opposition Vice Mayor of Stockholm and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Elke Decruynaere, Deputy Mayor, City of Ghent

Luca Vecchi, Mayor of Reggio Emilia

Jelena Pavicic Vukicevic, Deputy Mayor, City of Zagreb and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Lambelin Anne, Vice Présidente du Parti socialiste belge, PS

Tom Jungen, Secretary general, Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party – LSAP and Member of the European Committee of the Regions, and Mayor of Roeser 

Jaume Bartumeu, Former Prime Minister of Andorra 

Agustin Zamarron Moreno, Member of the Spanish Parliament

Santos Cerdán León, Member of the Spanish Parliament, Secretary for Territorial Coordination and Government Relation for the PSOE and President of the Pablo Iglesias Foundation

Carmen Gayo, Director, Oficina Alto Comisionado para la lucha contra la pobreza infantil

Jernej Pikalo, former Minister of Education of Slovenia 

Martina Vuk, former State Secretary, Slovenian Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs, Equal Opportunities

Lajos Korvìzs, Member of Hungarian Parliament and Chairman of the Social Committee

Tamas Harangozo, Member of Hungarian Parliament, First Deputy Parliamentary Group Leader MSZP

Sandor Szabo, Member of Hungarian Parliament

Ildikó Bangóné Borbély, Member of the Parliament, Hungarian Socialist Party MSZP

Tommaso Nannicini, Senator and Professor at Bocconi University

Lia Quartapelle, Member of the Italian Parliament

Kimmo Kiljunen, Member of the Finnish Parliament 

Katia Segers, Senator of the Belgian Senate and Member of the Flemish Parliament

Tero Shemeikka, International Secretary, Finnish Social Democratic Party, SDP

Anne Karjalainen, Member of the Kerava City Council, Member of the European Committee of the Regions the Chair of the Commission for Social Policy, Education, Employment and Culture (SEDEC)

Gustav A. Horn, Member of the Federal Executive Board of the SPD, SPD and FEPS Scientific Advisory Council

Cecilia Gondard, Secretary National in charge of gender Equality, Parti Socialiste

Miguel Carneiro, Mayor of Vila Boa do Bispo

Silvia Costa, Italian Government extraordinary appointed for Ventotene, former MEP

Christine Jung, City Councillor of Saarbrücken

Luca Menesini, President of the Province of Lucca, Mayor of Capannori and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Raffaella Curioni, City Councillor for Schooling and Education, Municipality of Reggio Emilia

Alessandra Medici, Local Councillor, Municipality of Guastalla 

Paul Sarrugia, President, South East Region of Malta

Aoife Breslin, Councillor, Labour Party of Ireland, and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Enzo Bianco, Local Councillor of Catania and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Heijo Höfer, Member of the Parliament, Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Vojko Obersnel, Mayor of Rijeka and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Krzysztof Matyjaszczyk, Mayor of the City of Częstochowa and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Vladimir Prebilič, Mayor of Kočevje Municipality and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Bayet Hughes, Mayor of Farciennes and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Javier Vila Ferrero, Director General of European Affairs, Government of Principality of Asturias

Manuela Bora, Member of the Regional Assembly, Marche Region

Reiner Zimmer, Member of the Parliament,SPD Fraktion im saarländischen Landtag

Marika Saar, Deputy Mayor of Elva municipality

Yoomi Renström, Mayor of Ovanåker and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Alison Gilliland, Chairperson Strategic Policy Committee for Housing, Dublin City Council, and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Jens Christian, Council member of Haderslev Municipality and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Mikko Aaltonen, Councilor of City of Tampere and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Dimitrios Birmpas, Member of Municipal Council, Municipality of Egaleo and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Guido Milana, Local Councillor of Olevano Romano and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Isolde Ries, Vice-President of the Saarland State Parliament, Vice-President of the European Committee of the Regions

Alessandra Medici, Local Councillor of Guastalla

Othmane  Yassine, Local Councillor of Fermignano

Lieve De Bosscher, Director, Childcare Services City of Ghent

Niklas Kossow, Member, SPD Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg

Edit Herczog, Member of the supervisory board, MSZP

Ilmar Reepalu, Chair of Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Guido Rink, Vice Mayor of the municipality of Emmen and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Filip Reinhag, Local Assembly, Gotland Region and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Per Bødker Andersen, Councillor of Kolding Municipality and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Samuel Gonzalez Westling, Vice Chairman of Hofors Municipality and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Pablo Rubio Medrano, Consejero Servicios Sociales y Gobernanza Pública, Government of La Rioja

Jakub Michał Kwaśny, Head of Tarnów City Council and Alternate Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Stavros Stavrinides, Municipal Councilor of Strovolos and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Jácint Horváth, Member of the local government, Nagykanizsa Municipality and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Mikkel Näkkäläjärvi, Member of the City Council, City of Rovaniemi and Member of the European Committee of the Regions

Stephan Durviaux, Cabinet Director, Presidency of the Parlement de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale

Chantal Jacquemart, Emploi, Stratégie 2030, Formation, Cabinet of the Minister-President of the Brussels-Capital Region

Albert Arcarons, Adviser to the Spanish High Commissioner against Child Poverty

Mariana Radu, Head of Division, Romanian Ministry of Justice

Mehnaz Aziz, Member of the National Assembly, National Parliament of Pakistan

CIVIL SOCIETY

Alfredo Sánchez-Monteseirín, Director, Pablo Iglesias Foundation and former Mayor of Sevilla

Mojca Kleva Kekuš, President of Društvo Progresiva

Liina Carr, Confederal Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)

Mikael Leyi, Secretary General, SOLIDAR Foundation

Jan Willem Goudriaan, General Secretary, European Public Services Unions (EPSU)

Jesús Gallego, Confederal Secretary for International Policy of UGT Spain

Domenico Proietti, Confederal Secretary, Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL)

Jana Hainsworth, Secretary General, Eurochild

Thomas Jansen, Secretary General h.c., International European Movement

Leonie Martin, President, Young European Federalists (JEF)

Gabor Harangozo, Director, Institute for Social Democracy

Fernando Savater, Philosopher

Fabrizio Barca, Coordinator, Forum Disuguaglianze e Diversità & former Minister for territorial cohesion

Enrico Giovannini, Director Italian Alliance for Sustainable Development – ASviS

Christophe Leclercq, Executive Chairman Europe’s MediaLab and Founder of Euractiv Media Network

Cristian Fabbi, President at Istituzione Nidi e Scuole dell’Infanzia del Comune di Reggio Emilia and Senior Expert on early childhood education and care, UNESCO

Elizabeth Gosme, Director, COFACE Family Europe

Chiara Piccolo, Brussels’ Representative, Alliance for Childhood European Network Group 

Réka Tunyogi, Head of Advocacy, Eurochild

Chiara Saraceno, Co-coordinator, Alleanza per l’Infanzia

Claudia Giudici, President, Reggio Children Srl

Guillaume Klossa, Founder of EuropaNova & Civico Europa

Mathijs Euwema, Director, International Child Development Initiatives (ICDI)
 

Kaisa Vatanen, Director, Kalevi Sorsa Foundation

Fabio Porcelli, Chief officer, UIL

Jackie Jones, Former MEP, Wales Assembly of Women

Benoit Van Keirsbilck, Director, Defence for Children international Belgium

Chahida Bufraquech, Education Officer, UNICEF Belgium

Szűcs Viktória, President, Hungarian Democratic Union of Nursery Workers (BDDSZ)

Anastasia Papaprokopiou, Scientific Coordinator, Society for the Development and Creative Occupation of Children (EADAP)

Yakarah Attias-Rosen, Managing Director, Learning for Well-being Foundation

Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Chairman, Jusos Brüssel

Eric Bloemkolk, Director, SOFT tulip Foundation 

Flora Bolter, Co-director Observatoire LGBT+, Fondation Jean Jaurès

Carolien De Groot, Directeur-bestuurder, Stichting Jeugd en Samenleving Rijnland

Rebecca Riess, Director, Le Furet Petite Enfance

Ulviyya Mikayilova, Executive Director, Center for Innovations in Education

Antonio Gaudioso, Secretary General, Cittadinanzattiva 

Gwendolyn Burchell, Director, United Aid for Azerbaijan

Daiga Zaķe, Director, Center for Education Initiatives

Flavio Brugnoli, Director, Centro Studi sul Federalismo

Anna Colombo, Political adviser, S&D Group

David Rinaldi, Director of Studies & Policy, FEPS and Lecturer, ULB- Institute for European Studies

Liana Ghent, Director, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Denise Deshaies, President, Neohumanist Education Association

Giorgio Tamburlini, President and CEO, Centro per la Salute del Bambino

Uroš Jauševec, Secretary General, Društvo Progresiva

Michal Rybacki, Policy Officer, Young European Federalists (JEF Europe)

Odile Harvey Mear, EU Correspondant, Radio Nord Bretagne – Radio Pays de Leon

Francisco Lontro, President, Ludotempo – Associação de Promoção do Brincar

Stephen Lintott, Group coordinator, Evergreen Elfins, Cambridge Woodcraft Folk

Hugo Alexandre de Araújo, International Cooperation Officer, Instituto de Apoio à Criança 

Klervi Kerneïs, Research assistant, Jacques Delors Institute

Azra Vrevic, Teacher, Elementary school

Lien Pattyn, Teacher, Artevelde Hogeschool 

Eric Battier, Mandataire, DIDR38

Helga Ramirez, Presidente, Association USDLI

Valentina Bezzi, Regional Director, East West Consulting

Iris Skrt, Member, Progresiva Slovenija

Admira Hrelja, Social worker, Primary School Hasan Kikić

Danica Mojić, Pedagogist, Kindergarten

Nedim Krajišnik, Deputy Director, Center for educational initiatives Step by Step


Carmen Lică, Executive Director, Step by Step Center for Education & Professional Development, Romania

Cornelia Cincilei, Director, Step by Step Moldova

Mihaela Ionescu, Program Director, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Agata D’Addato, Senior Project Manager, Eurochild

Serena Foracchia, European policy officer, Reggio Children

Gabriela Jorquera Rojas, Technical Advisor, Spanish High Commissioner against Child Poverty

Elisabeth Helander, Finnish Member of the Bureau of AIACE International

Boros Vilma, Fellow, Institute for Social Democracy

Olesya Kravchuk, Communications Officer, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Teresa Moreno, Communications Officer, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Konstantina Rentzou, Senior Program Manager, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Francesca Colombo, Senior Program Officer, International Step by Step Association (ISSA)

Almudena Hernandez Raboso, CEO, Clinica Podologica Hernandez  

Karleen De Rijcke, Coordinator, Kras vzw (Poverty Network Gent)

Anke van Keulen, Director, Bureau MUTANT

Matthieu Hornung, Member of the French PS and German SPD

Anna Kun, Member of MSZP

Katerina Nanou, Senior Advocacy Advisor, Child Poverty & Children in Alternative Care, Save the Children

Juhászné Katalin, MSZP

Ildikó Lendvai, MSZP

Katalin Devanszki, Hungarian Socialist Party

Nijole Dirginciene, Birstono  savivaldybė, Savivaldybes meras

Francesca Petrucci, Project manager, Associazione 21 Luglio

Ålvaro Ferrer Blanco, Advocacy Advisor, Educational Equity, Save the Children Spain

Michele Fiorillo, Civic Network Coordinator, CIVICO Europa

Giulia Contes, Delegue thématique, FBJS

Leonor Rodrigues, Researcher, ProChild CoLAB

Joyce Koeman, Diversity policy officer, KU Leuven 

Euléane Omez, Project officer for socio-economic policies, FEPS

Borbála Kajtárné Botár, MSZP Országos Pedagógus Tagoza

Giulia Loffredi, Parliamentary Assistant, Italian Chamber of Deputies

Eero Vuohula, Finnish activist and former EU official

Angelika Striedinger, Project Manager, Renner Institut

Ana del Barrio Saiz, Trainer-advisor Diversity & Inclusion, Ana del Barrio Training & Consulting 

Matevz Marc, Manager, ProcyonStar

Deborah McCahon, Chief Executive Officer, Woodcraft Folk

Maria Rosa Cremonesi, Principal, MIUR  

Maria Iacono, early childhood educator, Voghera 

Szeredi Péter, SZDI

Pádár Lászlóné, Tag, MSZP

Lieve Baert, Eversberg, Erembodegem

Isabel Sanchez, Trainee, European Parliament

Peter Kiss, MA student, Leiden University

Adela Dobrić, Kindergarten teacher, JU Obdanište Travnik

Vera Valsecchi, Communication, A.A.G Stucchi

Luís Guimarães, Student, ISCSP

Judit Rusznákné, Activist

Marco Rantino, Studio Tecnico Rantino 

Flavio Antei, Senior Sales Specialist, American Express

Borbála Kajtárné Botár, former teacher

Valentina Del Frate, Teacher, Italian Department for Education

ACADEMIA

Maria Herczog, Institute for Human Services (Columbus, Ohio), Lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University and Director of the Family Child Youth Association (Hungary)

Mathias Urban, Desmond Chair of Early Childhood Education, Dublin City University

Vivien Schmidt, Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration, Boston University

Anton Henerijck, Professor, European University Institute

Alberto Alemanno, Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law, HEC Paris & Founder, The Good Lobby

Fabio Masini, Jean Monnet Chair on History of European Economic Governance, Università Roma Tre

Bea Cantillon, Professor, University of Antwerp, Centre for Social Policy Herman Deleeck

Christian Morabito, Senior Researcher, Save The Children Italia

Michel Vandenbroeck, Professor, University of Ghent

Elsa Fornero, Honorary Professor, University of Turin & former Minister of Labour and Social Policies

Maurizio Ferrera, Professor, University of Milan

Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Professor of International Relations, University of Oxford

Antonio Padoa Schioppa, Emeritus Professor, University of Milan

Amandine Crespy, Professor, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Sofia Fernandes, Senior research fellow, Jacques Delors Institute

Roberto Castaldi, Director at CesUE and Associate Professor, eCampus University

Marga Marí Klose, Associate Professor, University of Barcelona

Sofie De Backer, Head of BA of Early Childhood Education, Artevelde University of Applied Sciences Ghent

Francesco Corti, Researcher, University of Milan and CEPS

Emilie Carosin, Researcher, University of Mons

Robin Huguenot-Noël, Doctoral Researcher, European University Institute

Yekaterina Chzhen, Assistant Professor, Trinity College Dublin

Geraldijne French, Head of the School of Language, Literacy and Early Childhood Education, Dublin City University

Maeve O’Brien, Professor of Human Development, Dublin City University

Jennifer Guevara, Rising Talent Fellow, Early Childhood Research Centre, Dublin City University

Laura Gormley, Assistant Professor,  Dublin City University

Claudio Cressati, Professor University of Udine and President of Informest

Emanuele Pavolini, Professor, Macerata University

Susanna Cafaro, Professor, Università del Salento

Guido Montani, Professor of International Political Economy, University of Pavia

Lara Navarro, Senior researcher, Barcelona Institute of Regional and Metropolitan Studies

Magnus Skjöld, Associate Professor, Bifröst University

Mario Telò, Professor, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Adriano Prosperi, Emeritus Professor  of Modern History, Scuola Normale Superiore

Alessandro Rosina, Professor, Università Cattolica di Milano

Antonio López-Pina, Professor of Constitutional & European Law, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Juan Manuel de Faramiñán Gilbert, Professor of International Law, University of Jaén

Giuliana Laschi, Professor, University of Bologna

Gino Roncaglia, Professor, Roma Tre University

Laura Leonardi, Professor, University of Florence

Stefano Amedeo, Professor, University of  Trieste

Paroula Naskou-Perraki, Professor,  University of Macedonia

Ludmila Petrashko, Professor, Kyiv National Economic University

Gurutz Jauregui, Emeritus Professor, University of the Basque Country

Federico Belotti, Associate Professor, University of Rome Tor Vergata

Ilze Plavgo, Research Associate, European University Institute

Veronica Donoso, Researcher, KU Leuven

Carmen Benavides, Professor, Universidad de Oviedo

Claudia Morini, Senior Researcher on EU law, University of Salento

Giovanni Trovato, Professor of Statistics and Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata

Piero Graglia, Professor of History of European Integration, University of Milan

Ivana Borić, Associate Professor, University of Zagreb

Giuseppe Inturri, Professor, University of Catania

Mehmet Toran, Associate Professor, Istanbul Kultur University

Sara Lembrechts, PhD researcher, Ghent University

Idesbald Nicaise, Professor emeritus, KU Leuven

Tuba Bircan, Assistant Professor & Research Coordinator for Interface Demography, Free University of Brussels (VUB)

Eva Vens, Lecturer, HOGENT, University of Applied Sciences and Art

Margaret Kernan, Senior Programme Manager, International Child Development Initiatives

Gökhan Kayılı, Associate Professor, Selcuk University

Caroline Loscher, School Support Coordinator, Primary Department, DCU Institute of Education

Ine Hostyn, Researcher, Artevelde University College

Brecht Peleman, Researcher, Ghent University, VBJK Centre for Innovation in the Early Years

Ahmet Simsar, Assistant Professor, Aralik Üniversitesi

Benedicte Vanblaere, Researcher and lecturer, Artevelde University of Applied Sciences         

Valerie Mcloughlin, Administrator, EDC, Dublin City University

Graziano Pini, Responsible CRISE, Università degli Studi di Modena e Reggio Emilia (Unimore)

Antonia Pup, West University of Timișoara

Laura Anton, Public relations specialist, Spiru Haret University

Manuel Sarmento, Professor, University of Minho

Natália Fernandes, Lecturer, University of Minho

Kathy Uvin, lecturer, Arteveldehogeschool

Isabel Soares Professor, University of Minho, School of Psychology

Caroline Detavernier, Director Expertise Network People and Society, Artevelde University of Applied Sciences

Dusan Sidjanski, Professeur Émérite, Membre du Comité de direction, Centre de Compétences Dusan Sidjanski en Etudes Européennes, Université de Genève

Ilse Gentier, Lecturer, Arteveldehogeschool Gent

Joao Pinto, PhD Candidate, University of Minho

Emre Gömec, PhD candidate, University of Kassel

Ana Sani, Associate Professor, Universidade Fernando Pessoa

Goedroen Juchtmans, Senior Researcher Education and Labour Market, KULeuven-HIVA

Rasson Anne-Catherine, Maître de conférences & Researcher, Université de Namur

Anne Sénécal, Department of Methodology and Education, Université de Mons

Rita Alcaraz, Lecturer, UNIANDRADE

Alba Lanau, Researcher, Centre of Demographic Studies

Albert Julià, Professor, University of Barcelona

David Martinez de Lafuente, Researcher, Iseak

George Tsobanoglou, Full Professor, University of the Aegean

Marc Demeuse, Professor, University of Mons

Derobertmasure Antoine, Professor, University of Mons

Natacha Duroisi, Associate Professor, University of Mons

Sandrine Lothaire, Assistant, University of Mons

Marco Antei, Professor, Universidad de Costa Rica

Boyan Durankev, Faculty of finance, business and entrepreneurship, VUZF University

Maria Carmen Silveira Barbosa, Professor and Researcher, University of RGS (UFRGS)

Catarina Tomás, Assistant professor and Researcher, Escola Superior de Educação de Lisboa and CICS.NOVA 

Heloísa Lins, Professor, Universidade Estadual de Campinas 

Europe’s response to the pandemic comes in the form of a major undertaking, the Next Generation EU recovery plan, based on a European public debt and new own resources. The Commission’s commitment to offering young people a future shows that European solidarity exists. But there are various rarely discussed phenomena that are gradually eroding it.

            The one I would like to examine is the phenomenon of citizenship for sale. Many countries, large and small, sell their citizenship to those who can pay for it. As well as republics in the Caribbean, the US, Canada, the UK and Russia all advertise it on the web, and in the EU you can pay to become a citizen of Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, Portugal, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Romania, Lithuania, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Luxembourg and Austria. The cost of a “Golden Visa” varies greatly from country to country, with some countries setting conditions such as residence, a certain amount in private investments or public debt, and some offering generous discounts on taxes.

            The issue was debated in the European Parliament, which in 2014 passed a resolution that stated, “EU citizenship should not be for sale at any price”. Furthermore, an in-depth study (EPRS, October 2018) warns member countries against this practice, due to possible negative consequences such as financial instability, harmful fiscal competition, excessive investments in real estate, the infiltration of organised crime, political corruption and lastly, the most damaging consequence, citizens’ loss of trust in democratic institutions. Yet despite these warnings, the citizenship market thrives.

            The sale of national citizenship is a side effect of the financial globalization that began in the 1980s. It is a parallel phenomenon to that of tax competition between countries, which began to reduce corporate tax rates to attract foreign investments. This has proven to be a suicidal practice, especially for European countries with expensive welfare programs, which now increasingly depend on the taxation of income from immovable property and work, and less and less on that of mobile assets such as the capital of companies and individuals, which/who can move their wealth to safe places. National sovereignty is being eroded not by external threats, but by an internal cancer, because the political class is scraping the barrel and putting the family heirlooms up for sale.

            Citizenship is a valuable public good; it is the very substance of a political community. In the history of humanity, the process we call civilization began when the individual questioned belonging to a political community, as happened, in pre-modern forms, in the Greek polis and the Roman empire. In the contemporary age, civil progress has assumed a form defined by the French revolution, based on the declaration of “the rights of man and the citizen”, when the multitude of subjects demanded to be recognised as citizens – a new legal status which did away with privileges and discrimination. “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” are the values that identify post-revolutionary people.

            The sale of citizenship of an EU member country is doubly wrong. It injures democracy, because citizenship is sold to wealthy individuals who are primarily interested in exploiting the single European market and national and European voting rights. Indeed, article 3 of the Lisbon Treaty states: “Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. It also deprives the Union of its power to regulate the crossing of its external borders. Article 77 of the TFU states that the Union must “develop a policy with a view to carrying out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders”, and ensure “the gradual introduction of an integrated management system for external borders”. How can we justify the fact that European citizenship is granted to the wealthy, yet denied to poor individuals looking for work and a new homeland? The former become EU citizens, the latter subjects. Moreover, the distinction between refugees and economic migrants is destined to become increasingly blurred with the rise in “ecological migrants” fleeing their countries as a result of global warming.

            There is no simple, clear cut answer to these problems, but I would like to suggest two possible reforms. The first reform consists in giving the Union, as indicated in article 77 of the TFU, clear concurrent powers when it comes to granting European citizenship to third parties from non-member countries. If a person is granted the right to vote in Europe, the main reason for this must be political, because the European Parliament plays an active role in defining the Union’s policies and is elected by a multi-national people of European citizens, not the multitude. The granting of national and European citizenship must therefore be approved by the European Commission and the sale of national citizenship must be prohibited.

            Based on the principle that crossing the borders of the Union implies an explicit European decision, the EU should have the power to grant “citizenship of residence”, or local citizenship (Ius domicilii) to those who legitimately request it. This could be one way to solve the long-standing controversy over the Dublin Regulation and European immigration policy. The alternative to the trafficking of migrants is the creation of legitimate channels for migration, as the EU is doing with the African Union (Joint Communiqué, 29th February 2020). Local citizenship would enable immigrants to be integrated into a local community, which could be chosen when applying, for example, to the African Union. Of course, the EU must comply with national governments and local European governments (cities, provinces, regions) to plan how many migrants to accept, because local and national political sensitivities need to be taken into account. Naturally those who benefit from citizenship of residence must respect the rights and duties enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and will only able to vote on the local level, because voting in national and European elections requires national citizenship.

            The second proposal concerns the introduction of compulsory European civil service, coordinated with member country. Politics nowadays is dominated by uncertainty: some decisions are taken at a national level, others at the European level and others at world level. In some countries of the Union, citizens fight, sometimes vehemently, for demands that cannot be met, or become prey to populist or illiberal parties, led by demagogues promising a brighter future. Democracy is in danger. One of the possible remedies for this is to remind young people, when they reach voting age, that citizenship entails duties as well as rights, because political communities break down if there is no sense of membership – and membership means giving as well as receiving. A European civil service would enable young people to work in their community (on any levels, from local to global) on projects concerning health and social services, environmental protection, collective security and international aid. Public goods are not a gift of nature; they are the result of selfless human action, deliberately pursued for the good of others, as we saw during the pandemic, with the tireless efforts of healthcare workers.

            These two proposals should be taken into consideration at the forthcoming Conference on the future of Europe.

Think and act like a citizen of the world

In our politically and economically interdependent world the idea of progress seems to have disappeared. The major powers have taken up the nuclear arms race once more, investing heavily in the military sector when what we urgently need is effective international cooperation on sustainable development to halt global warming. It is only right, and entirely understandable that young people are protesting. So what can be done to ensure a future for humankind?

On the Mediterranean island of Ventotene in 1941 a group of anti-fascists wrote the Manifesto for a Free and United Europe, in which they proposed a new idea of progress: at the end of the war, they envisaged the continent’s sovereign states cooperating peacefully thanks to “the creation of a solid international state”. This revolutionary message – no more wars – spurred people of good will and organizations of volunteers and politicians to fight for European unity. Their work played a decisive role in the construction of the European Union (EU), the first supranational organization in history.

But the European Union remains a weak institution, whose survival is threatened by the current scenario of increasing international disorder. The current pandemic is also jeopardizing the EU’s political cohesion. And although the fact that a “European Green Deal” is on the table is an encouraging sign, if it does not lead to a World Green Deal we cannot expect to solve the environmental crisis.

The Ventotene Lighthouse aims to spark the debate and political initiatives necessary to assert a new idea of progress. Many European citizens have understood that the European Union, however imperfect, has guaranteed more than 70 years of peace on this continent. This represents a public good that is not just European but global. We are European citizens hailing from various member states. Our governments have said no to war, and are committed to resolving the inevitable economic, social and political clashes that arise by applying the rule of law rather than military force. Europe’s citizens can now study, work and circulate freely throughout all of the Union’s countries.

The European model can also be adopted by other continents, as is happening in Latin America, Africa and Asia. On a world scale, global governance – namely peaceful cooperation between the major powers to tackle the climate emergency and initiate a controlled process of disarmament – is both necessary and possible. Subsequently the status of world citizenship, similar to European citizenship, could be introduced.

Some will say that this is a utopia, an unrealistic dream. It is not so. The same accusation was levelled at the federalists when they proposed a United States of Europe as the goal of the integration process. The European Union is an unfinished federation, but its history shows that without an idea of progress politics remains trapped in the past. The task of the political avant-garde is to point the way forward.

The Ventotene Lighthouse speaks not only to the vanguard. To party politicians and national governments we say: how can you guarantee the safety of your citizens if the enemy can arm itself with nuclear missiles many times faster than the speed of sound? The counter-strike – needed in a matter of minutes – would inevitably have to be entrusted to artificial intelligence, but that would leave you open to risking the complete annihilation of both your own country and the rest of the world (as in the days of the MAD scenario). We also ask you: why are you not listening to the urgent appeals of the scientists warning us that we are about to pass a tipping point in global warming? Beyond that point, your citizens will be condemned to a lingering death. Lastly, we say: to tackle the global emergencies we face, why do you not enable the UN and all the other international organizations (like the IMF, the WTO, etc.) to reinstate the rules of multilateralism, now compromised by the rising tide of nationalism, and why do you not permit international tribunals to defend the rights of the world’s citizens – proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, but not enforced by the law?

This battle can be won. In the nineteenth century the governments of Europe, bolstered by their industrial power, devoted their energies to colonization, subjugating almost all of the earth’s peoples. After dividing up the spoils they set upon each other in the fight for planetary supremacy. The two world wars put an end to this nationalistic power-mongering, and in the post-war period the two super-powers, the US and the USSR, guaranteed a sort of weaponized truce – the balance of terror – that enabled many nations, both industrialized and developing, to grow economically. Now, the two super-powers have left the scene: one disintegrated after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the other is behaving like an arrogant nation state, even refusing to cooperate in efforts to save the planet.

This scenario of increasing international disorder is being fueled by second generation nationalism. Nationalism is the ideology of the sovereign nation state and the just war. Whenever they can, nationalists attempt to assert their supremacy over other states (America First, Russia First, China First, etc.), and they reinforce their domestic power by pursuing policies of cultural homogenization: everywhere, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities are being oppressed. In the 1920s this is what enabled dictators like Mussolini and Hitler to exploit the weakness of democratic governments and seize power, triggering a global cataclysm. We run the same risk today.

The Ventotene Lighthouse believes that it is possible to halt this self-destructive trend. Worldwide, civil society shares a culture that shows its openness to solidarity and friendship between peoples; production chains are inextricably linked across national confines; students willingly pursue their education in different countries and speak several languages; scientific and technological research knows no borders, and the same is true of communication networks, epidemics and migration flows. We inhabit a world that we view as our natural homeland, while planning interplanetary voyages.

Second generation nationalism can be defeated by a movement that relentlessly exposes the lies told by national governments opposed to the creation of supranational institutions, in their continents or globally. The physical and political barriers that divide the people of this planet must be torn down. We cannot let the spreaders of hate implement their doom-laden designs.

The first step is to think and act like a citizen of the world.

The Ventotene Lighthouse