The COVID-19 pandemic has profoundly shaped and speeded up the actions taken at European level, especially regarding the economic governance. As a consequence, also the debate about further reforms has been affected, as the previous agenda has been totally overcomed by the events.

This crucial aspect about the future of the EU economic governance has been addressed, among others, by a Policy Brief of the Jacques Delors Centre (“Everything will be different: How the pandemic is changing EU economic governance“), which highlights and discusses some key points. Based on this very interesting work, we would like here to provide our thoughts and recommendations on the main issues raised.

EU fiscal capacity and common debt

The first aspect to deal with is the newly EU fiscal capacity and its common debt. First of all, it is worth noting that the EU has been able to incur common debt under the current Treaties, which made it possible to provide a common answer to the crisis in a relatively short time. This will also enable the EU to fund new common expenditures in the future, under the legal basis already used. It is telling that Paolo Gentiloni, the European Commissioner for Economy, has recently noted that “if you introduce a new tool that works, it can be repeated”.

The Next Generation EU has been a dramatic turning point in the process of the European integration. For a start, the European Commission has been invested with the duty of closely monitoring the investment plans drawn up by the member states. Even if the projects will not be directly managed by the Commission itself, the investment guidelines provided and monitoring authority assigned at European level gives to the Next Generation EU a real sense of common federal action.

Additionally, the Next Generation EU allocates the resources to the member states by taking into account the asymmetric effects of the crisis. In general, it can be argued that a larger EU budget was badly needed in any case, regardless of the current economic situation: indeed, a large centralised federal budget is required for a currency union to work properly. Specifically, one of the primary goals of a federal budget is to provide support to specific areas within the union affected by an asymmetric shock. The ECB had already taken a comparable step in March 2020 when it launched the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP) and, in doing so, it dropped the Capital Key rule by allowing itself to buy more sovereign bonds of the countries hit hardest by the pandemic. With the creation of the Recovery Plan, also the fiscal lever is now available to tackle asymmetric shocks, bringing the European Union closer to a proper federation.

Apart from the importance in fighting the COVID-19 related crisis, a key issue is what all this means for the future. According to the current redemption schedule, the EU will eventually withdraw its bonds from the market (the current plan is to start repayment in 2028, over the next three decades). This would be a mistake. It’s preferable for the EU to roll over its debt and keep its safe bonds on the market. Firstly, simply because withdrawing the EU common bonds would essentially mean transferring such a debt on the member states, which would be politically undesirable and financially expensive. But most of all, keeping the EU bonds on the market would be essential for creating a Capital Market Union, strengthening the international role of the Euro and making it easier to set up new European investment plans in the coming years. It is no surprise that Mario Draghi, the former ECB boss and current Italian Prime Minister, has recently called for the creation of the Eurobonds. In particular, in a comparison with the US, he stressed the importance of having a truly Euro safe asset, an integrated Capital Market and a Banking Union: these aspects would help creating a vast, common market for firms and consumers, with the obvious related benefits.

Lastly on this topic, the reform agenda must include a rethinking of the public debt and deficit rules. This aspect is far too complex to be technically addressed here; it needs an in-depth analysis by economists and politicians alike. We want here just to highlight a couple of points. The various thresholds on the public debt and deficit, as well as the path to reduce and keep them under control, were set up in a completely different economic context. Now, we have been facing a low interest rates – low inflation environment for more than a decade. Only in recent times economists have seriously started talking about inflation again, as lockdown measures are going to be eased and the effects of the enormous fiscal and monetary stimulus on the price dynamic have yet to be fully seen. In general, the need is to combine a set of rules that are flexible, in order to be adapted to the evolving economic environment, but also credible – for convincing the market and the public that the Government debts will not run out of control. But even more important, the rules need to be rethought in light of the new European public debt, which removes the burden of some expenditures from the national Governments and which in effect has created a new big macroeconomic player: the European Union.

Economic and Institutional architecture

After the Euro crisis, the EU created a framework for preventing and managing future shocks. The main problem with this architecture was that the process was largely technocratic, and the Economic Recommendations given to the member states were widely ignored. The monitoring authority given to the European Commission within the Next Generation EU will replace such a construction, transforming a technocratic process into a political one. Regardless of the specific form that future common investment vehicles will have, it will be necessary to maintain this type of control for economic policy coordination. Indeed, this political mechanism is far better than a technocratic one since it is more transparent and it makes the Commission accountable in front of the European citizens, making the whole system more democratic and understood from the general public.

Against this backdrop, one clear example is provided by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM was an instrument specifically designed to be used during periods of financial distress and, given the exogenous nature of the crisis, the member states agreed to remove almost all the conditions attached to it: the only one remaining was to use the funds for health care costs, both direct and indirect. And yet the ESM has totally gone unused. The reason for this failure is twofold. First of all, in many countries populist parties used the pretext of the old tough conditions imposed during the Greek crisis to campaign against the new ESM which, as said, has actually been cleared by these very conditions. If you think this makes no sense, it’s because it doesn’t. Nevertheless, the intergovernmental nature of the ESM didn’t help in making it transparent and easily understandable by the citizens, thus somewhat facilitating the populist argument.

But most of all, the reason lies in the fact that no country would have known what to do with the ESM funds. Applying for the ESM loan required a plan for reforming the sanitary system, which no one had prepared. The pandemic has swept all national health systems and shown how ill prepared they were for managing a major challenge. In this respect, it would be more appropriate to introduce a European basic health system: the aim should be to provide common guidelines to the different countries in order to ensure equal treatment for all citizens of the Union, especially – but not only – in critical situations. Indeed, inequalities are totally unacceptable when it comes to personal health. A good case in point is given by the vaccines: smaller and less rich member states would have incurred difficulties in getting a fair share of vaccines. The centralised management of the situation by the European Commission, which was put in charge of procuring vaccines for a population of 450 million, has prevented this intolerable outcome. This is true, of course, regardless of the possible errors in the negotiations made by the Commission: this is not a judgment on the goodness of the work of the Commission in this case; this is an indication of how it is appropriate to structurally divide the tasks between member states and Europe to avoid inequalities. Setting up a European basic health system would help in ensuring equality in such a relevant context.

These examples show that the political interventions – which are necessary to implement the NextGenEU investments – make the Commission’s action increasingly political and not just technical, as it was when the European Semester was in place. And this will inevitably affect the future European governance.

Eurozone and EU-27

Lastly, the events of the last few years have cast doubts on the need of focusing certain reforms on the Eurozone dimension instead of the whole EU-27. The first step in this direction has been the UK’s exit from the EU. Even if “Remain” would overall have been a preferable outcome and the effects of Brexit will be a controversial issue for a long time, it is known that the UK has often tried and succeeded in watering down ambitious EU reforms. As a consequence, the focus needed to be shifted on the Eurozone dimension to make significant progress in such areas. As Brexit has become a reality, this is no longer the case. Indeed, it can be argued that the Next Generation EU would not have been possible with the UK in the EU (even if we cannot be sure of this, given that the dramatic circumstances called for unprecedented answers).

In addition, the non-euro member states have lost considerable weight. And looking forward they will even more, as new countries will join the Eurozone. This reinforces the case for addressing more issues at EU level, leaving aside the Eurozone format.

As a matter of fact, the Next Generation EU is a EU-27 project, as well as the 2021-2027 revamped EU budget. This has made the talks for a Eurozone budget totally obsolete and the decision-making has shifted at EU level. This is not only good in principle, but also convenient in practice: acting within the framework of the Union law makes it often possible to take decisions by qualified majority, instead of by unanimity. This allows to speed up the process of decision-making, a key point in successful politics. In this context, it is very important to point out that we are not facing a trade-off between reactive decisions and democracy. At a first glance, it may seem that unanimity requirements guarantee the respect of the will of everyone; but in reality, a situation where a single country has the power to block the other 26 can hardly be defined as a functioning democracy. Thus, the right direction should be to make it clear that in certain areas the sovereignty is correctly allocated at European level – for better serving the interests of all member states, as in the case of the Next Generation EU – and that in such areas the EU-27 framework should always be chosen whenever possible.

Jaap Hoeksma (1948) studied philosophy of law at the Free University of Amsterdam. He worked with the Office of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees and published on asylum and refugee law. In 1992 he focussed  his attention on the newly established European Union, turned the EU into a board game about European democracy and developed the theory of democratic integration as an explanatory model for the functioning of the EU as a European democracy.

The name of the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (1872-1945) does not figure prominently among the intellectual protagonists of European democracy. As a conservative by heart, he appreciated the value of national states and cultures. In his capacity of rector magnificus of the Leyden University he ordered a delegation from Nazi-Germany in 1933 to leave an academic meeting.[1] He actively participated in the transnational interbellum debate about the future of Europe and warned in an almost prophetic way against the impending dangers for European civilisation. After the invasion of The Netherlands by Hitler-Germany he was taken as a hostage to the hostage camp of St Michielsgestel and subsequently condemned to internal exile in the hamlet of De Steeg. Huizinga did not live to see the liberation of his country, but his legacy contained the blueprint for the construction of a post war-Europe, which was published after his death in 1945.[2]  

Curbing absolute sovereignty

The political will of the historian Huizinga contains a striking similarity with the Manifest, that was written eighty years ago in the Italian internment camp of Ventotene by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi. The aged Dutch conservative and the young Italian communists agreed on the maxim that absolute sovereignty destroys absolutely. The conclusion, which the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto drew from this unsustainable state of affairs, was that the division of Europe in national sovereign states had to be abolished. They envisaged the creation of a ‘solid international state’. As a cultural philosopher Huizinga displayed a somewhat more cautious approach. He argued that the peacemakers of 1919 had missed a historic opportunity to secure a stable world order. ‘When they had the chance to renew the system of global governance, they failed to see that the concept of absolute sovereignty had become obsolete.’ As a result, the peace of Versailles had sown the seeds for politics of revenge, aggression and, ultimately, a second world war. Looking ahead in the final chapter, Huizinga suggested that permanent peace should be achieved through law. In his view, the only way for the small states of Europe to obtain safety and security was through integration in a new legal order with the larger ones. So, while the authors of the Ventotene Manifesto wanted to address the problem of absolute sovereignty by abolishing the sovereign states altogether, Huizinga preferred to reign in the sovereignty of those states by the creation of an overarching legal order in post-war Europe.  

The Kantian dilemma of statehood and international law

The differences of view between these authors concerning the strategy to curb absolute sovereignty illustrates the Kantian dilemma of statehood and international law. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the first scholar to investigate the possibilities for states to create a situation of lasting peace. On the eve of the Napoleonic wars he suggested in his essay ‘Zum Ewigen Frieden’, which was forbidden by the Nazi’s in the Third Reich, that states wishing to attain perpetual peace could either merge into a federal state or agree to form a federation of free states.[3] In the first option, sovereignty would be transferred by the participating states to their common creation; in the second option sovereignty would remain with the states involved. As they would be guided by their shared desire for peace, war would no longer be justified as a last resort, but rejected as morally condemnable. 

            In his essay, which contained a severe critique on the Western norms and civilisation of his time, Kant explored the limits of the so-called Westphalian system of International Relations. The Westphalian system emerged in the aftermath of the Middle Ages as a code of conduct between modern states. Its name stems from the German region of Westphalia, which formed the scene of comprehensive peace negotiations in the 17^th century. Ambassadors from almost all European states and the Holy See had gathered in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück with a view to bring an end to both the devastating Thirty Years’ War in Germany and the Eighty Years’ War between Spain and The Netherlands. The outcome of their deliberations, which were informed by the works of Grotius (1583-1645), constituted the basis for modern international law. In this system, war is the ultimate means of the resolution of conflicts between states. It may not be conducted at whim but requires both a formal declaration and a serious cause (casus belli).     

            At present, the Westphalian paradigm underlies the functioning of the Organisation of the United Nations, in which regional organisations of states are playing a more significant role than in previous times, notably with respect to the maintenance of peace. Two centuries after Kant, the dichotomy between sovereign states and organisations of free states has only sharpened. Seen in this perspective, the differences of view between Spinelli and Huizinga accentuate the Kantian dilemma of statehood and international law. Spinelli chose the federal option by transferring the sovereignty from the belligerent states to the new one, whereas Huizinga preferred to curb the absolute sovereignty of the European states through the voluntary creation of a new legal order. For theorists and politicians of the day, other options were not available. Tertium non datur![4]    

The Conference on the Future of Europe

The Westphalian paradigm proved to be so dominant that it has seriously hampered the evolution of the EU. Generations of students in Europe and abroad have been educated with the idea that its predecessors and the EU were an organisation sui generis, that could neither be identified nor categorised. The late Michael Burgess even coined the phrase that the EU works in practice, although it cannot function in theory.[5] Seventy years after the start of the process of European integration the Conference on the Future of Europe offers an excellent opportunity to come to terms with the own and distinct character of the European Union. The challenge for the participants is to demonstrate that the EU can work in theory and to improve its functioning in practice.  

            One of the greatest mistakes the participants in and stakeholders to the Conference could make would be to take the concept of EU democracy for granted. Quite some commentators and activists argue that democracy is under threat in various parts of the world, that the USA has narrowly escaped a coup d’état, that the military have staged a successful takeover in Myanmar, that several Middle-European EU member states are flouting the rule of law and that democracy in the EU itself is also under serious threat. Such an approach would give rise to major conceptual mistakes. It notably overlooks the fact that the EU is still a young and consequently imperfect democracy. In fact, the EU is giving the democratic idea a major boost by establishing itself as the first-ever transnational democracy in the world! In the process it has to overcome considerable hurdles. The most recent obstacles are Brexit and the EZB-Urteil of the German Constitutional Court.[6] In his notorious Bloomsberg-speech of January 2013, in which he announced his decision to organise a referendum about British membership of the European Union, David Cameron criticized the EU as undemocratic organisation since only the member states could be democratic. It followed in his logic that the EU should return to Westphalia and reform itself into a traditional organisation of states. In a similar vein, the German Constitutional Court has developed the view in a series of subsequent verdicts that EU citizenship is not a ‘real’ status, that the European Parliament is not a ‘real’ parliament and that it is also impossible for the EU Court of Justice to be regarded and respected as a judge of last resort. The EU needs to make a considerable theoretical effort to counter this kind of criticism, if it wants to establish and present itself as a European democracy. It is therefore most timely and appropriate that the signatories of the Joint Declaration on the Conference on the Future of Europa have expressed their determination ‘to seize the opportunity to underpin the democratic legitimacy and functioning of the European project’. The purpose of the present essay is to respond to the call of the presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission by

1. identifying the EU as a new subject of international law,
2. presenting an own and distinct political philosophy for the EU and
3. demonstrating that the EU has replaced the Westphalian system of International Relations with an own model of governance, which will be introduced as the European Model of Transnational Governance.

The conclusion, which will be drawn towards to end of the essay, is that the combined endeavour of Spinelli and Huizinga to curb the absolute sovereignty of states in Europe has resulted in the emergence of the EU as a new subject of international law (a democratic regional organisation) with an innovative system of governance (the European Model of Transnational Governance).       

From union of democratic states…..

Looking through the lens of Spinelli, Huizinga and all the others who wanted Nie Wieder Krieg, the evolution of the European experiment may be described as a deviation of the Westphalian paradigm.[7] In contrast to the Council of Europe, which was established in 1949 with a view to promote human rights and democracy all over Europe, the six founding members of the present EU (France, the FRG, Italy and the Benelux-countries) agreed to make the renewed outbreak of war between them not only unthinkable, but also virtually impossible. The means through which they intended to achieve this goal consisted of the sharing of sovereignty. In order to ensure the prevention of mutual war, the participating states transferred their sovereignty in the fields of coal and steel to a higher authority. Although this decision implied a revolutionary rupture with the Westphalian system, the member states of the 1952 ECSC learned in practice that the sharing of sovereignty in a limited field was a reasonable price to pay for peace. 

            Encouraged by the success of their experiment the six decided to proceed on their path towards a new model of transnational relations by extending the practice of shared sovereignty to the whole of the economy. In 1957 they established the EEC with a view to further the prosperity of their nations and citizens. They expressed their determination to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and aimed to create an internal market. The Court of Justice of the Communities found in 1963 that the member states had indeed created a new and autonomous legal order between themselves and ruled a year later that the law of the Communities has direct effect and – in case of conflict- precedes national rules and regulations.[8] Taking stock of the turbulent developments the newly founded European Council described the Communities after the first enlargement in 1973 as a ‘Union of democratic States’.[9]

…to democratic regional organisation

From a conceptual point of view the Communities formed a more or less regular regional organisation, albeit that the member states had to comply with certain democratic criteria and the organisation possessed an autonomous legal order. In hindsight, however, the qualification of the Communities as a ‘Union of democratic States’ implied the start of a paradigm clash inasmuch as the Westphalian system holds that organisations of states cannot be democratic, whereas the democratic principle suggests that there is no point in governing an organisation of democratic states in an undemocratic manner. In line with their aspiration to create an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, the members of the European Council decided to give their organisation democratic legitimacy too. Consequently, the first direct elections for the European Parliament were held in the spring of 1979. For the first time, the citizens of the member states were entitled to elect candidates from their country as Members of the European Parliament!

            The subsequent evolution of the EU can no longer be explained by theories embedded in the Westphalian system. The theory of democratic integration offers a fresh perspective by suggesting that, if two or more states agree to share the exercise of sovereignty in a number of fields with the view to attain common goals, the organisation they establish for this purpose should be democratic too. From the viewpoint, the decision of the European Council to establish a citizenship of the Union was of fundamental importance.[10] Although the Council envisaged to complete the internal market, the introduction of EU citizenship by virtue of the Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for the emergence of a European democracy. After the Danish voters had made clear during their first referendum about the Treaty on European Union (TEU) that they did not want to give up their national status in favour of EU citizenship, the Council emphasized that EU citizenship is an additional status, which does not replace the national status of the citizens involved (art 9 TEU).  

            The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty formed another step away from the Westphalian system towards an alternative model of governance. It included ‘democracy’ in the core values of the Union proper and introduced a procedure to guarantee the respect for the EU’s values by the member states (art 7 TEU). In doing so, ‘Amsterdam’ accentuated the concept of dual democracy, which has become a hallmark of the Union. Meanwhile, the member states participating in the Economic and Monetary Union were preparing the introduction of the euro as single currency of the Union. This implied a major deviation from ‘Westphalia’ too as unions of states are not supposed to administer and support their own coins. The 2000 summit of Nice saw the proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, which was hailed as the ‘Magna Charta’ of the newly created citizens of the Union. It was integrated in the treaties through the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, which came to replace the ill-fated Constitution for Europe after its rejection by the French and the Dutch electorates in the spring of 2005.    

            The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is that it construes the EU as a democracy without turning the Union into a State. Title II TEU contains the democratic principles of the EU and underlines that ‘citizens are directly represented at Union level by the European Parliament’ (art 10, para 2, TEU).[11] The far-reaching consequences of the new construction were illuminated through the case law of the ECJ, notably with respect to the status of EU citizens, who are now entitled to say ‘Civis Europaeus sum’.[12] Moreover, the ECJ established in two recent verdicts that the EU has an ‘autonomous democracy’.[13] On the eve of the Conference on the Future of Europe it may therefore be concluded that the EU has evolved to a Union of democratic States, which also constitutes a democracy of its own. As a ‘democratic Union of democratic States’ the EU forms neither a state nor a union of states. Instead, it may be identified with a new term as a democratic regional organisation.[14]

The European Model of Transnational Governance

Although the EU has reached its constitutional destination as a democratic Union of democratic states, its evolution towards an ever closer union continues. The introduction of a rule of law mechanism in the granting of EU subsidies to individual member states may be regarded as the ultimate confirmation of the new model of governance beyond the Westphalian system, which has transformed Europe over the decades. The characteristics of the traditional Westphalian system and the emerging European Model of Transnational Governance may be contrasted as follows:

                                                           Westphalian system                    European model

Sovereignty                                      Absolute                                           Shared

War                                                    Not excluded                                    Impossible

Borders & Customs                        National                                            External

Market                                               National                                            Internal

Citizenship                                       National                                            Dual

Currency                                          National                                            Single

Democracy                                       National                                            Dual

Internal Affairs                                 Non-interference                             Rule of law Mech

Global stage                                     irrelevant                                          major player

Messages of hope

The transformation of Europe from a war-torn continent to a democratic regional organisation may contain two messages of hope for the global community. On the long run, the introduction of EU citizenship may inspire the United Nations to create a UN citizenship. In a comparable way as EU citizenship had laid the basis for a European democracy, the citizenship of the United Nations may result in the emergence of a system of democratic governance at the global level. In a more immediate future the evolution of the EU into a democratic regional organisation may serve as a symbol of confidence for other unions of states with democratic aspirations. Obviously, each continent has to follow its own path, but the emergence of transnational democracies in other parts of the world will not only contribute to the realisation of the goals of the United Nations, but also to an improvement of the present system of global governance.[15]

---

[1] A. van der Lem, Johan Huizinga, Leven en werk in beelden & documenten, Amsterdam 1993

[2] J. Huizinga, Geschonden Wereld, Haarlem 1945

[3] I. Kant, Zum Ewigen Frieden, Königsbergen 1796

[4] P. Magnette, What is the European Union?, London 2005

[5] M. Burgess, Comparative Federalism, Theory and Practice, London 2006

[6] J. Hoeksma, The Case BundesVerfassungsGericht versus EU Court of Justice, Oisterwijk 2020

[7] W. van Gerven, The European Union: a polity of states and peoples, Stanford 2005

[8] Cases Van Gend en Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 and Costa vs E.N.E.L., ECLI:EU:C:1964:66

[9] Declaration on European Identity, Copenhagen 1973, EC Bulletin 12-1973

[10] J. Hoeksma, The Theory of Democratic Integration, Oisterwijk 2018

[11] From the conceptual viewpoint, it should also be noted that the treaty gave the EU legal personality!

[12] K. Lenaerts, ‘Civis Europaeus Sum’, from the Cross-border link to the Status of Citizen of the Union, in: Constitutionalising the EU judicial system, Cardonnel, Rosas & Wahl, Oxford 2012

[13] Cases Puppinck and others, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1113 and Junqueras Vies, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1115

[14] J. Hoeksma, European Democracy, Tilburg 2019

[15] M. Teló (ed), Reforming Multilateralism in Post-Covid Times, Brussels 2020

Andrew Duff argues that the Union’s top priority is to settle the matter of how to elect the Commission in 2024. He believes that the EU should aim to have major constitutional reforms in place by 2029, including a renegotiation of the Brexit deal leading to new class of affiliate membership; completion of banking and capital markets union leading to fiscal union; a fully legitimated European Parliament; and the bridging of the divide between the EU and NATO beneath a European Security Council.

Brexit II

The European Union has still to come to terms with Brexit. Clearly, the business of managing the secession of the United Kingdom has been very costly in terms of time and effort since Prime Minister Cameron launched his renegotiation of the terms of British membership in 2015. But there are important lessons to learn for the future of Europe. The unprompted departure of a rich and powerful member state marks the end of the EU’s classic strategy of widening and deepening in parallel, first articulated at the summit of The Hague in 1969. Brexit has confounded the historic mission of the Union. “Ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” is now impossible. The British remain a European people but have chosen the path of disintegration.

During the secession negotiations, many ‘Brexiteers’ argued that no deal would be better than a bad deal. That was, of course, nonsense, and at the last minute, on Christmas Eve 2020, a deal was done. But the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) turns out nonetheless to be a bad deal. It will not endure. There are no tariffs on goods, but supply chains are badly disrupted by tightened rules of origin requirements, the imposition of border checks on tax and customs, and controls on health and safety. The problems of doing business across the Channel are compounded by the erection of a veritable frontier between Great Britain and the province of Northern Ireland, which remains inside the EU’s customs union. The TCA does virtually nothing for trade in services, for mobility of people, or for cooperation in foreign and security policy. Fisheries remain a bone of contention, especially with France.

The UK is highly likely to ask the EU for a comprehensive renegotiation of its Trade and Cooperation Agreement, starting in 2024. One may imagine that by then the Conservatives will be turfed out of office, although the capacity for incompetence and internal division within the opposition parties in the House of Commons should not be underestimated. Even a new Conservative government will be back in Brussels as demandeur. The renegotiation agenda will be centred on measures to improve British access to the single market of the type that Michel Barnier dismissed as unacceptable “cherry-picking” during the process under the secession clause (Article 50 Treaty on European Union (TEU)). While the cohesion of the EU 27 has been impressive in the course of Brexit I, will it continue to be so in Brexit II? Will other member states, such as Hungary and Poland, seek to emulate the British and try to improve their own terms of EU membership?

Renegotiation will give rise to the same thorny issues which complicated the conclusion of the initial deal. How will reciprocity and mutual recognition be defined and applied to EU UK trade in services? Can the new British regulatory framework be trusted by the Commission across the spectrum of the internal market, from environmental protection to state aids? There is a strong case for a return to free exchange with the vast pool of capital liquidity and expert financial services in the City of London, but equivalence needs to be supervised. European arts and sciences will certainly benefit from a restoration of former links with Britain, but on what terms?

The likely outcome of Brexit II will be a Ukraine-type association agreement based on a deep and comprehensive free area. Over time, however, this may prove to be too meagre a basis for the EU’s British partnership, especially if the appetite grows for closer political cooperation in security and defence. There will be no British application to re-join the EU as a full member state. But one might expect the UK to seek a new form of affiliate membership of the Union, involving at least partial engagement with the EU’s institutions. As such a membership category does not exist under the present treaties, the request from London would add to the pressure on the Union to embark on a new round of treaty change.

If the UK were to lead the way towards developing the concept of affiliate status, other third countries would surely follow, including Norway. Adoption of a second tier class of EU membership would also make sense for the Western Balkans, Ukraine and, ultimately, Turkey. As further enlargement of the Union has already become practically and politically impossible, the additional option of affiliate membership would relieve the Union of an intractable neighbourhood problem.

The prospect of treaty change terrifies the Union. But the departure of the irredeemably eurosceptic British makes it more feasible for others to move forward in a federal direction. Affiliate membership would act as a safe haven, like a voie de détresse on an Alpine pass, for any current member state which chose not to take the federal route.

Fiscal union

The other main driver towards federal union is the common fiscal policy which begins to emerge perceptibly in response to the devastating impact on the European economy of the coronavirus pandemic. The EU’s decision to raise common debt on a large scale to aid economic recovery is unprecedented and must be managed well. Both the revenue and expenditure aspects of the Next Generation recovery programme should be delivered in as federal a manner as possible. In particular, the €672.5bn Recovery and Resilience Facility — of which €312.5bn is in the form of grants — should be disbursed by the Commission only to investments aimed at producing real added value with a European dimension. The experiment in common debt issuance will be quickly discredited if the Commission surrenders to short-term, pro-cyclical projects favoured by national party politicians. Although the debt initiative has been sold to ‘frugal’ states as one-off, never to be repeated, if the launch of eurobonds on this scale is successful there will be no reason whatsoever not to repeat it in the future.

Ideally, too, the holders of these eurobonds should be paid not from the proceeds of national GNI contributions to the EU budget but only from genuine own resources raised by EU taxation. This requires a compartmentalisation of the EU budget into federal and confederal sections, a reform which will not only save national treasuries money but will also connect directly the EU citizen as a taxpayer with the government of the European fiscal union. An EU Treasury Secretary will then be established within the Commission, leading logically to other necessary reforms to consolidate the banking and capital markets union, including the full integration of the European Stability Mechanism. The job of the Commission will then be to run a common economic policy of the Union and not merely to try to coordinate national economic policies, as it does now.

The Article 50 (TEU) process succeeded in concentrating executive authority on the Commission, and this trend should be continued in the fiscal field. Treaty amendment is needed to codify the changes already in train and to reform the fiscal rules of the eurozone. Fortuitously, there can be no better advocate for the completion of fiscal policy reform in the European Council than Mario Draghi.

European Security Council

Left to their own devices, neither the EU nor NATO has proved itself capable of delivering the effective, intelligent security that Europe needs. Indeed, until today the division between the two Brussels based organisations has made synergy impossible. Many people doubt that the EU will ever develop a coherent common foreign and security policy. NATO is still in search of a post-Cold War strategic concept, and struggles to keep the Americans engaged. The election of President Biden and the departure of the British from the EU open up an opportunity to think afresh about the architecture of Western security. The need for new institutions is self-evident: if EU enlargement has stopped, new organic linkages must be invented to cater for the security needs of the whole European neighbourhood.

President Macron has been the foremost intelligent critic of the present arrangements. If he gets re-elected in 2022 he will be in a good position to propose an overarching security concept which breaks down the barriers between the EU and NATO. A joint meeting of the North Atlantic Council and the European Council could decide to establish a regular system of meetings of defence ministers, including those of the US and UK. Jens Stoltenberg retires as NATO Secretary-General in 2022. His successor should be an EU defence minister appointed as the permanent dual-hatted president of the new ministerial body.

Treaty change

Such innovations for the European Union in the field of membership, fiscal union and defence policy will require changing the Treaty of Lisbon. That exercise must be well prepared. There is talk of the Conference on the Future of Europe — but in truth there is no sincere agreement within the EU institutions let alone between them about the purpose, organisation or leadership of such a Conference. The governance proposed for the Conference looks to be clumsy and over-weight, its deliberative processes confused and objectives unclear. The President of the Commission, the conservative Ursula von der Leyen, is unwilling to take the lead in the Conference. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, appears to have washed his hands of it. Needless to add, the constraints imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic do not help the Conference. The imminence of the German and French elections will further blunt the force of reform.

In any event, there will have to be a Convention in advance of treaty amendment, and it is here where pressure from federalists will be most pertinent. Setting the target date of 2029 for the new constitutional settlement to enter into force seems reasonable. That year will be the 50^th anniversary of the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament. Is it too much to hope that to celebrate that occasion some MEPs will be elected from transnational lists for a pan-EU constituency? Federal political parties are badly needed to realise the dream of Altiero Spinelli and to make our new European polity better governed and fully legitimate.

Unfortunately, electoral reform will only be postponed by the submission of the matter to a talking-shop Conference. The European Parliament already has the full right of initiative to initiate transnational lists. There is no case whatsoever for granting MEPs an extended right of legislative initiative unless and until they use the right they already have with respect to electoral reform. Once reform has rendered the Parliament authentically European, however, MEPs should be granted the right to vote on the federal part of the Union’s revenue.

More generally, we must make an effort to render the Treaties less prohibitive and more permissive, enhancing the EU’s capacity to act. QMV in the Council should be extended to decisions on taxation, own resources revenue and the multi-annual financial framework. The Commission and not the Council should represent the eurozone in international monetary affairs. Other Council functions, such as fixing agricultural prices and fisheries quotas, should be transferred to the Commission. If the more differentiated, wider Europe we foresee is to hold together, the centre must begin to act and look like a federal government.

Prerequisite for such a transformation is to reduce the size of the college of Commissioners at the time of its next composition in 2024. Of all the items crowding the Union’s agenda, this is the most pressing — and can be achieved under the terms of the Lisbon treaty (Article 17(5) TEU). The search for von der Leyen’s successor should be starting now.

In his memorable speech at the Sorbonne on 26 September 2017, the French President Emmanuel Macron presented a well-structured and convincing plan for relaunching the project of European unification, which has basically been on hold since the 2008 financial crisis. In this article I do not intend to discuss all of his proposals, which I myself agree with, but rather to comment on the concept of European sovereignty, which Macron indicates as an ideological objective for the future of the European Union.

In one part of his speech, Macron stated: “The […] key to our sovereignty is industrial and monetary economic power”, in short, the Economic and Monetary Union. At other points he proposes a “Defence Europe” and a “European defence fund”. Concluding, he summarizes his proposals as follows: “Finally, the essence of the European project is democracy. … For Europe, sovereignty, unity and democracy are inextricably linked. … We must promote this indivisible triangle”.

Here, I mean to show that while “unity and democracy” are two of the main pillars supporting the European project, the concept of European sovereignty is misleading: it would be more accurate to say “the powers and competences that must be entrusted to the democratic government of the Union by member states”. The concept of sovereignty is an ideological notion which is closely linked to the birth of the nation state and which cannot serve as a guide for the future of the EU.

I will present the reasons for this empirical approach in two stages: in the first I will indicate some contradictions between France’s foreign policy, still based on national sovereignty, and the notion of European sovereignty; subsequently, I will discuss the European Union’s foreign policy, a policy crucial to halting and reversing the trend towards growing international disorder, exacerbated by Trump’s nationalistic policies.

In a recent interview with Le Grand Continent (16/11/2020), Macron was asked “Can Westphalian sovereignty coexist with the climate crisis?” To which he replied: “Yes, because I have not personally found a better system than Westphalian sovereignty. If it is the idea of saying that a people in a nation decides to choose its leaders and have people to pass its laws, I think that is perfectly compatible because otherwise who is going to decide? How would the people get together and decide? … For decades now, Western democracies have been making their peoples feel that they no longer know how to solve their problems. …That is the crisis of democracies: it is a crisis of scale and efficiency. But I do not believe at all that it is a crisis of Westphalian sovereignty. … In everything I do internationally, for me what is paramount is always the sovereignty of the people”. There is no doubt that national democracies around the world are in crisis, but the answer cannot just be to boost the effectiveness of national democracies, because when the international order breaks down, as happened between the two World Wars, democratic regimes are no longer able to respond effectively to international challenges, be that economic security (as happened with the 1929 depression) or military security (to curb hegemonic projects like Hitler’s). Democracy becomes fragile when authoritarianism advances. Contemporary nationalism has emerged in increasingly aggressive forms since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the USSR. Macron does not understand the root causes of the crisis of the international order and therefore supports the foreign policy of France, as a national state, which actually prevents the construction of an independent European Union. French national policy has the effect of preventing the pursuit of “strategic autonomy” for the EU, a concept that was adopted many years ago as the basic orientation of the Union’s foreign policy.

We can observe the recent consequences of France’s foreign policy in two crucial areas, the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, including Russia. When it comes to Libya, France supported General Haftar against Al-Serraji, thus favouring the intervention of Turkey and Russia in the region; in Lebanon, he attempted to cast France – rather than the EU – in a peacemaking role, ultimately to no avail, and in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, between two states that belong to the EU-promoted Eastern Partnership (EaP) – the European Union stood out for its absence, thus giving Turkey and Russia an opportunity to further extend their influence in the Caucasian area. Why is the EU unable to act effectively in these regions? According to Macron: “We have built European defence capabilities, although it was thought unthinkable” (LGC). The reality is different, as Josep Borrell clearly demonstrates: “In conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya or Syria, we are witnessing a form of ‘astanisation’ (in reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to Europe’s exclusion from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey. Nature abhors a vacuum: we risk now seeing Russian and Turkish military bases being established in Libya, a few kilometres away from our coasts. In order to emerge from this situation and to be able to settle our conflicts peacefully with these new empires built on values that we do not share, we must continue to fill the gaps in our common defence capabilities. This is the price which must be paid to give birth to the geopolitical Europe that President Von der Leyen and the European Commission have called for” (Le Grand Continent, 14/12/2020).

Now let’s look at the issue of the defence and security of the Union, which means talking about the future of NATO. In his interview with LGC, Macron was undoubtedly aware of the proposal from Germany’s SPD party to create a 28^th Union Army, namely a European army at the disposal of the democratic organs of the EU. Yet he does not mention it, as if the question of European defence had already been solved. Perhaps Macron believes that French  defences, which also include nuclear weapons, are sufficient to guarantee the security of the other countries in the Union, a doctrine that goes back to de Gaulle. Yet this sentiment is not shared by Eastern European countries such as Poland or the Baltic nations, which look to the United States and NATO for protection. Macron criticizes NATO’s shortcomings, as he did in 2019 when he argued that the Atlantic Alliance was experiencing “brain death”.  This criticism is justified, but what alternative does Macron offer? The SPD proposal would effectively achieve the “strategic autonomy” of the EU. Here it would take too long to go into the details of an issue that is undoubtedly key to Europe and for world peace. I will merely recall the contents of a ‘Policy paper’ written by three federalists entitled A New Atlantic Pact. A Peaceful Cooperation Area from Vancouver to Vladivostok (The Ventotene Lighthouse, 7/10/2020), which considers – and updates – Gorbachev’s 1987 proposal for a “Common European Home”. This proposal was abandoned after the break-up of the USSR, because European and US policy for the eastward expansion of NATO – despite Kohl promising Gorbachev otherwise – ended up compromising relations with Russia: Russia had initially been invited to join NATO in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), to launch a more intense form of economic and military cooperation, later interrupted by the crisis in Ukraine, disputed between Europe and Russia. The paper argues for the need to resume peaceful cooperation with Russia, inviting it to participate in a free trade area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, and re-enter the PfP until the time is ripe for further steps. The paper also proposes creating a European security system based on a “dual army”, a proposal similar to that of the SPD. More peaceful relations between the EU and Russia would indirectly contribute to changing international relations between the EU, the US, Russia and China, and reducing the level of nationalistic competition between the great powers.

European foreign policy, however, is not limited to Euro-Atlantic relations. There are global political challenges which urgently need to be addressed. The mob attack on the US Capitol was not only a vulgar insult to democracy, but is also indicative of the further weakening of US leadership in the world, because in the coming years the US is likely to be divided internally by social and political rifts. The international institutions created after the Second World War were designed by the US to guarantee “a safe world for democracy”: the UN charter is based on “Westphalian sovereignty”, but contains rules to mitigate conflicts, through the Security Council, and a number of agencies to support economic stability (the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT), health (the WHO), agriculture (the FAO), human rights, etc. This architecture, which was based on multilateralism as the US wished, and was originally accepted by 40 other countries including the USSR – withstood the crises and turmoil of the Cold War. However the break-up of the USSR heralded an ongoing erosion of the post-war order, and the emergence of new global powers, such as China, Russia, India, Japan and Brazil, etc., was inevitable, giving rise to a multipolar system with no world government. Trump’s policies have shown that the US prefers bipolarism to multilateralism, an approach that benefits the stronger country. This return to conflicting international relations will continue in a different form even under the Biden administration, because there are currents in the Democratic Party that are in favour of protectionism and nationalism.

 If the European Union proves unable to contain the nationalist leanings of the major powers, it will face a global challenge which could have dramatic consequences. A relentless struggle for world hegemony would end up bringing down the European construction. Each European country that wants to maintain its sovereignty in foreign policy, as Macron does, will be drawn into the hegemonic orbit of one or another major world power. To face this challenge, the European Union must equip itself with effective capacity for foreign policy that goes beyond what is currently in place, as the EMU; i.e. a European defence force (the 28^th EU army) and a reinforced European budget, because foreign policy also requires fiscal capacity. The European Commission, endowed with new powers, would be accountable to a two-chamber Parliament (the EP and the Council of Ministers voting by a majority).

 This reform is possible, but in the meantime some global challenges need to be addressed through the existing institutions. The first is the Glasgow Climate Conference on 1-12 November 2021. The EU will be appearing at this important event as a world leader, thanks to the launch of the European Green Deal which – in addition to the positive results achieved in the past (from Kyoto onwards) – represents a pioneering foreign policy initiative (global CO₂ emissions: China 28%, USA 15%, EU 9%, India 7%, Japan 3%). Multilateralism can no longer be guaranteed by a hegemonic superpower, but will have to be built gradually through peaceful cooperation – a global governance by the major players of world politics. Among these, the EU stands out as the leading power in a select number of forward-thinking countries (about a hundred) in favour of a global plan for the sustainable development of the planet. Security policy in the twenty-first century – the century of the Anthropocene – no longer depends solely on the military might of each power, but on their ability to guarantee a sustainable future, as indicated by the Global Development Goals (UN 2015). Over the past decades national governments have passed the burden of the structural adjustments needed to combat climate change onto future generations. Now, the young people of Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion are demanding a sustainable future. The human species, like other animal species, could become extinct if we fail to meet the objectives agreed in Paris in 2015 (to limit the level of global temperature rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels). We are now approaching 2°C; if this trend is not halted by the end of the century we will be looking at an increase of 4°C, with devastating consequences for all forms of life.

 Preparing for COP 26 in Glasgow will not be easy. The major world powers need to accept strict limits. The new Biden administration is taking an ambiguous position in this regard: while it has declared that it is in favour of the Paris objectives, it has launched the idea of a summit of democracies that could end up having overtones of the Cold War, if understood as an anti-Chinese alliance. China’s environmental policy is also ambiguous: its commitment to achieving CO₂ neutrality by 2060 is positive, but in the meantime the Chinese government is financing the construction of coal-fired power plants both in China (17 new plants) and beyond, with a few hundred in Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt and the Philippines, thanks to the Belt and Road Initiative. The negotiations ahead of the Glasgow conference will have to address these problems. The battle is on. If there is the will to do so, it will be possible to achieve the goal of CO₂ neutrality by the middle of the century. However, past experience suggests caution. No matter how many promises governments make, without a binding form of coordination on a global scale it will be unlikely that national environmental plans are respected. The practice of passing the buck onto future generations could continue.

The European Commission has managed to relaunch European cohesion among the 27 thanks to the Next Generation EU plan, perceived by European citizens as a European public good. This initiative has beaten back national sovereignty in the various political formations. A similar proposal should be adopted in the run-up to Glasgow, so that international political cohesion is guaranteed by there being obvious advantages to cooperation, an added benefit that each UN country can acquire by signing up for a World Green Deal in good faith.The world plan should be based on the use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), a kind of world currency issued by the IMF, as UN Secretary Guterres has proposed. This first initiative, crucial for economic stability, should be accompanied by a tax on the profits of multinational companies to finance the World Green Deal. Global sustainability will only become effective if poor and emerging countries can work harmoniously: the efforts of each single country should be teamed by collective hope for the future. More aid for development, a boost for renewable energies and strengthening the WHO to combat the pandemic effectively will help reduce the gap in wealth and well-being between the world’s rich and poor. Contrary to what Macron believes, the UN can and should be endowed with supranational powers. This is the first step towards a post-Westphalian order.

 The return to multilateralism is obviously about more than just environmental policies. There are other crucial problems, such as atomic and conventional disarmament, the regulation of international trade and finance, respect for human rights, etc. Ultimately, the goal should be to reduce nationalistic conflicts between the great world powers to create a global governance, a key objective when it comes to saving democracy threatened by national sovereignty in every country.

In this article I have deliberately avoided a doctrinal discussion of the relationship between the concepts of sovereignty, state and democracy. Treaties on international law and international relations devote much attention to these issues. I merely wished to show that we can tackle the problem of the European Union’s foreign policy and security without resorting to the hackneyed concept of sovereignty. In the century of the Anthropocene, what sense is there in striving to defend the sovereignty of a single nation, or Europe as a whole, when the future of humanity is at risk? Sovereignty is a political concept that came about to foster the creation and consolidation of nation states. Today this archaeological relic should be left in the hands of the nostalgic custodians of the past.

“Europe was born in a crisis and will be forged in crises”, Altiero Spinelli used to say, convinced that European unity was “the political project of our time”.

27th December 2020 will probably go down in Europeans’ collective memory as the day when the Union, as it began distributing the vaccine to all its member countries, showed that it was capable of offering its citizens protection and acting as a united front against the virus, a common enemy which has had a devastating impact on our health and our way of life. Ursula Von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, has stated that the vaccine will also be distributed to the Western Balkan countries (not yet members of the EU) and North Africa: this represents the first concrete step in a European foreign policy.

An institution that guarantees these “common goods” is already a state, albeit incomplete.

Faced with this huge global crisis, the European Union reacted promptly. Despite the handicap of a decision-making process that does not always allow majority voting, the EU has made clear political choices, equipping itself with the tools to face both the pandemic and the serious economic downturn generated by the lockdown.

Firstly, the prompt intervention of the ECB enabled the purchase of government bonds from the countries most affected by the pandemic. Then the Commission suspended the “Stability and Growth Pact” to allow states to go into debt to fund the first measures to support businesses and citizens; it also set up a “European unemployment scheme” (SURE) worth 100 billion euros.

But, above all, last May the Commission – which now increasingly resembles a “European government” – launched the Recovery Plan for Europe, whose name recalls the Marshall Plan (the European Recovery Program), the initiative that helped rebuild Europe after the war.   

As is known, the Plan is based on two instruments. The first is Next Generation EU, namely 750 billion euros in investments aimed at funding the recovery and, at the same time, managing the transformation of the European economy towards the energy transition and the digital revolution. The second is the increase in budget (from 1% to 2% of European GDP), and the addition of European debt securities (union bonds) to finance investments. New “own resources” for the Union are also in the pipeline, from a carbon border tax (to reduce CO₂ emissions), to a web tax (on tech giants), as well as the introduction of measures to combat tax havens and money laundering.

The Plan’s “political philosophy” is clear: to put Europe back on its feet and drive change, in the direction of the Green Deal and the digital revolution, to enable the Union to face global challenges on an equal footing with the other superpowers.  “Nation states are no longer the answer” is a sentiment shared by Angela Merkel, leader of the most important EU country, and Ursula Von der Leyen, representative of the “European government”: two women who personify the shift from national to European politics.

The Recovery Plan therefore represents a strong, united political response, which has made it possible to overcome the flaw that “hobbled” the Maastricht treaty (creating a currency without a state, as is generally said), teaming the euro with the first form of European economic policy: investments based on common resources, guaranteed by a stronger budget. In this respect, the Plan is therefore revolutionary: it marks the introduction of a European fiscal capacity, additional to and operating in parallel with that of the Member States. And all of this has been achieved without reforming the Treaties: the Union has thus strengthened its implicitly federal nature, upholding the principle that European solidarity is  possible if there is common control over the use of resources, guaranteed by common rules and institutions.

This philosophy also enabled the “compromise” reached at the end of the year, which establishes a link between the distribution of common resources and respect for the rule of law. Like all compromises, it is not entirely satisfactory, but it has allowed the resources of Next Gen EU to be linked to respect for the rule of law, removing the veto threatened by Poland and Hungary.

The objectives of the Recovery Plan are valid not only for Europe, but also the rest of the world, which has to find a cooperative, non-conflictual way of managing both the environmental crisis and the technological revolution. Europe is leading the energy transition and helping to write the rules for the digital revolution, showing people that there needs to be a “common sovereignty” over a number of global public goods, at the service of humanity.

The Covid crisis has made us all too aware of both our precarity and our interdependent destinies.  

It has shown us the importance of Europe in this new multipolar world, and the need to unite against the immense ecological, economic, social, health and security challenges facing our societies. 

Today the Europeans have an opportunity to make the European Union the first democratic, multinational and multilingual power, built by citizens and open to the world. Let’s seize that opportunity.

Call to Citizens and leaders of the Union

The appeal can be signed here: https://forms.gle/iR75h4riKhv9DKpFA

*******

Today we Europeans have an opportunity to make the European Union the first democratic, multinational and multilingual power, built by citizens and open to the world.

Let’s seize that opportunity.

The Covid crisis has made us all too aware of both our precarity and our interdependent destinies.  

It has shown us the importance of Europe in this new multipolar world, and the need to unite against the immense ecological, economic, social, health and security challenges facing our societies. 

It has revealed the unique character of our economic and social model.

In these unprecedented times, and despite powerful though illusory temptations to turn inwards, the EU has chosen to face outward, and understands the utter vanity of every man for himself.

During the first wave of the pandemic, Europeans dared to invent new forms of solidarity, establishing  a collective support system for struggling enterprises and unemployed citizens, as well as conceiving a recovery plan unprecedented in its size, philosophy and respect for rule of law. A Union that takes stock from its crises to strengthen its resilience and better protect its citizens.

While we are pleased about all this, we are also aware that these actions and plans only make sense if they serve the lasting interests of the citizens of the Union and are part of a perspective of regeneration of the European project. 

There is a huge risk of having rules and lifestyles imposed on us that we do not want, especially in the digital domain dominated by a few systemic platforms.

What alternative?

First of all, giving us the means to succeed in the concrete implementation of the European recovery plan, while keeping, in the meantime, the economy. support systems; the extension of the coverage of employment and income support for all categories of workers, including those in precarious, atypical or self-employed work.

Its financial magnitude is major but a real reflection on the quality of the investments required to have a strong impact on sustainable and socially inclusive growth has not taken place.

As they stand, the national recovery plans that are currently being drafted and that will be notably financed by European money, take up old, outdated digital and ecological projects.

There is an urgent need to correct the situation and better involve the social partners and citizens in the choices to be made, while promoting investments with a truly European dimension, capable of forging a New European Deal, including an ambitious Green New Deal.

It is the success of this plan that will break the mistrust between frugal and spending  Member States and create the conditions for a real, long term European budget, the only one able to make Europe an economic, ecological and cultural power of the 21st century.  

Secondly, it is a question of making the Conference on the Future of Europe an experience of real democratic citizen participation.

Its ambition must be clear: to build a forward-looking, bold and shared vision of our future for the coming decades. 

The WeEuropeans experience, which has reached 38 million citizens in 27 countries and in 24 languages, shows a real appetite of European citizens to participate in defining our common future through a new form of continuous participatory and deliberative democracy, which complements our representative democracies.   

Only this new democratic impetus, which engenders genuine European citizenship, can lead to a Union of well-being, of peace and solidarity, providing opportunities for everyone. A Union which, by mobilising citizens, States, public authorities and social partners, will be able to provide concrete solutions to the rise in inequalities and unemployment; which contributes to the preservation of the planet; which guarantees and defends its fundamental values of unity, freedom, solidarity and democracy.

The urgency today is to give us the means to decide in a more legitimate, efficient and rapid way. This decision-making capacity is indispensable at a time when the technological transformations and the rebalancing of the world’s major powers are accelerating.

The current Treaties allow us to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting system in certain areas. 

Let us apply qualified majority voting to all the Union’s policies and actions as soon as possible.

Let us move from a system of weak cooperation to a project of common construction!

We regret the departure of our British friends and we are convinced that a special and extremely close relationship will be established with London. 

But if there is one lesson to be learned from their accession and departure, it is that the more exceptions are accepted for a Member State, the less it grows in European unity and solidarity.

The time has undoubtedly come to make the unity of our Union a real reality.

Let us be clear: this will only be possible if we truly value our diversity and the cultural, economic, social and historical contributions of each and every one of us.

Let us finally have the audacity to put culture at the heart of European software to once again become this major centre of world creation capable of attracting the best talent in the world.

But once again, this new European stage will only be possible if every citizen takes ownership of the European project through the institutionalisation of a process of deliberative democracy that is continuous, transparent, inclusive and guarantees concrete implementation of the decisions taken. This is an essential condition for making the Union everyone’s project!

The window of opportunity is narrow but the context is favourable at European and global level.

Our collective responsibility is immense. 

While there is still time, let us bring together the millions of citizens from the four corners of our Union who are ready to commit themselves.   

This appeal can be supported and signed here: https://forms.gle/iR75h4riKhv9DKpFA

* Signatories

On the initiative of the co-Presidents of CIVICO Europa, Guillaume Klossa, former sherpa for the reflection group on the future of Europe (European Council) and former Director of the European  Broadcasting Union, and Francesca Ratti, former Secretary general of the European Parliament : 

László Andor (HU),  Economist, former European Commissioner;

Lionel Baier (CH), film Director; 

Brando Benifei (IT), Member of the European Parliament, S&D group, President of the Spinelli Group;

Massimo Cacciari (IT), Philosopher, former Mayor of Venice, former Member of the European Parliament;

Jasmina Cibic (SI),  Artist;

Daniel Cohn-Bendit (FR/DE), former President of the Greens group in the European Parliament;

Jože P. Damijan (SI), Economist;

Axel Dauchez (FR), Founder of Make.org;

Philippe de Buck (BE), former Director General of Business Europe; 

Paul Dujardin (BE), Director General of BOZAR; 

Pascal Durand (FR), Member of the European Parliament, Renew Europe group;

Anthony Ferreira (FR), Secretary General of CIVICO Europa;

Michele Fiorillo (IT), Philosopher, Coordinator of CIVICO Europa network;

Cynthia Fleury (FR), Philosopher;

Markus Gabriel (DE), Philosopher; 

Costa-Gavras (FR/GR), Film Director;

Felipe González (ES), former Prime Minister, former President of the Reflection Group on the Future of Europe;

Sandro Gozi (IT), Member of the European Parliament, Renew Europe group, President of the Union of European Federalists (UEF), former European Affairs Minister;

Ulrike Guérot (DE), Political Scientist, Director of the European Democracy Lab;

Danuta Hübner (PL), former European Commissioner, Member of the European Parliament, EPP group ;

Aleksander Kwaśniewski (PL), former President of the Republic;

Philippe Lamberts (BE), Co-President of The Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament;

Jernej Lorenci (SI), Theater Director;

Luisa Arezzo (IT), Director of “Scuole di Roma” Association;

Robert Menasse (AT), European Writer in German;

Jonathan Moskovic (BE), former Coordinator of G1000, Adviser for democratic innovation;

Stojan Pelko (SI), former Secretary of State for Culture;

Janez Pipan (SI) Theater Director;

Rossen Plevneliev (BG), former President of the Republic;

Janez Potočnik (SI), former European Commissioner;

Sneška Quaedvlieg-Mihailović (NL/RS), Secretary General of Europa Nostra; 

Nina Rawal (SE), Founder of “Emerging Health Ventures”;

Maria João Rodrigues (PT), President of the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), former Member of the European Parliament;

Petre Roman (RO), former Prime Minister;

Yvan Sagnet (CM), Writer, Founder of NoCap Association;

Fernando Savater (ES),  Philosopher; 

Roberto Saviano (IT), Writer; 

Elly Schlein (IT), Vice-President of the Emilia Romagna Region, former Member of the   European Parliament;

Andreas Schwab (DE), Member of the European Parliament, EPP group;

Gesine Schwan (DE), President of the Humboldt-Viadrina governance platform;

Daniela Schwarzer (DE), Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP);

Denis Simonneau (FR), President of EuropaNova;

Claus Haugaard Sørensen (DK), former Director General of the European Commission; 

Farid Tabarki (NL), Founder of Studio Zeitgeist; 

Danilo Türk (SI), former President of Republic, President of the World Leadership Alliance-Club de Madrid;

Guy Verhofstadt (BE), former Prime Minister, Member of the European Parliament, Renew Europe group; 

Boštjan Videmšek (SI), Journalist, EU Climate Pact Ambassador;

Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga (LV), former President of the Republic;

Cédric Villani (FR), Mathematician, Fields Medal, Member of Parliament ;

Pietro Vimont (FR), Founder Member of CIVICO Europa;

Luca Visentini (IT), General Secretary of the European Trade Union Confederation;

Sasha Waltz & Jochen Sandig (DE), respectively Choreographer and Director of the Sasha Waltz Company;

Alenka Zupančič (SI), Philosopher;

Samuel Žbogar (SI), Head of EU Delegation in Skopje, former EU Special Representative in Kosovo, former Minister of Foreign Affairs;

Slavoj Žižek (SI), Philosopher.

This appeal can be supported and signed here: https://forms.gle/iR75h4riKhv9DKpFA

Contact: guillaume.klossa@civico.eu – francesca.ratti@civico.eu 

Link: https://civico.eu/news/for-a-democratic-european-power-call-to-citizens-and-leaders-of-the-union-1/

During one year Italy will chair for the first time the G20 – the network of the more developed countries in the world for their global GNP (90%), the import/export (80%), the inhabitants (2/3 of the humanity), the cultivated lands (60%) and the agricultural products (80%) – and mainly the meeting of the leaders that will take place in Bari the 30^th and the 31^st of October after the G7 chaired by the United Kingdom and the COP26 of Glasgow from the 1^st to the 12^th of November.

The G20 is an intergovernmental network born in Washington in 2008, after the explosion of the biggest economic depression in 2008 eighty years after the Great Depression in 1929, with the aim or the illusion that the “Greats of the Planet” were able to assure the governance of the world on the way of an international cooperation founded on the principle: nobody left behind.

As we know – and that is its weakness, its no accountability and its no capacity to deliver – the G20 is a jumble of liberal democracies and totalitarian states, of free market systems and countries where the State capitalism prevails, of economies coming from years and years of industrial development and productive systems of new industrialisation, of countries engaged in the respect of the Sustainable Development Goals and States very far to the objective of a free carbon society.

All the debates made around the bedside of the international financial system have been without tangible results, the planet is paying the non-respect of the step-by-step implementation of the Agenda 2030 and between the Twenties (the permanent nineteen countries, the European Union as such and the permanent observers as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the OECD and UN) nobody has had the idea to put again on the agenda the question of the reform of the UN Security Council – stopped for years – following the initiative launched by the group Uniting for Consensus or, thinking big, supporting the campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. 

Between the very minimalist proposals, the group suggests to avoid the obstacle of the permanent seats enhancing the representativity of the regional groups, giving to Africa the largest number of temporary seats, acknowledging to Asia the highest percentage increase and doubling the seats of Latin America and Eastern Europe.

If we would relaunch a global governance founded on the principle of multilateralism – left during the four years of the Trumpism but not only by Donald Trump – by rotating it around the “three P” (People, Planet and Prosperity) it is necessary to start with the main objective: nobody left behind.

In view of the G20, the think-tank are diffusing a globe where the members of the network are indicated by different colours following their status as full members, permanent observers or special guests.

What strikes a geopolitical eye is the lack of the fifty-five States of the African Union – with the only exception of South Africa – in a Summit and in a great number of preparatory and parallel meetings where the participants will discuss about the social effect of digitalization, the climate change, the sustainable energy sources, the international trade, the transnational terrorism and last but not least the fight against pandemics “in view of a sustainable, fair and resilient recovery”.

Each point of the G20 Agenda contains a question, that will remain without answers from the leaders, concerning all the five continents and related to the epochal phenomenon of the migration movements bound to grow because of the effects of the climate change, the social consequences of the pandemics and the international trade more and more less fair and supportive.

The question of the world governance of the migration movements shouldn’t be separated to the human dignity right which is trampled in many countries of the G20, starting with Saudi Arabia that has hosted the meeting of the leaders last November.

We want remember thus right when a part of the world is celebrating the international day of the life in the cities dedicated to the abolition of the death penalty “legally” binding in at least one third of the G20 members.

All these arguments confirm the necessity and the urgency to invite the African Union as such because the participation of the South Africa leader, acting president of the African Union, isn’t enough.

Finally, we submit to the Italian government the proposal to offer, as an essential reading, to then leaders and the delegations a copy of the Manifesto of Ventotene written during the winter of 1941 in this Mediterranean Island.

The Manifesto exists in all the EU twenty-four official languages and also in Arabic but it could be easily translated in Chinese, Russian, Japanese, Turkish and in the main African languages.

It  could be useful to raise the attention of the participants to the fact that the recovery of the multilateralism implies a merciless battle against the absolute sovereignty, a debate on the modern crisis of our civilization which is the first chapter of the Manifesto and the acknowledge that the European Federation is the only warranty for a peaceful cooperation “in view of a far future when it could be possible the political unity of the planet”.

The agreement reached by the European Council on 21 July 2020 has been widely reported as a major breakthrough in European integration. Rightly so. For the first time, a very large bond issuance (to the tune of 750 billion euros) by the European Union will partly finance budgetary expenses and direct transfers to the Member States and sectors most in need of assistance due to the coronavirus pandemic. In addition, on paper at least, the EU leaders agreed on the need to introduce pan-European forms of taxation (on digital platforms, C02 emissions, even financial transactions), beyond a modest tax on non-recycled plastic, in order to finance the repayment of this long-dated common debt issuance. Crucially, the Recovery Plan is supposed to be spent through the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), whose own resources ceiling is increased up to 2 per cent of the EU´s GNI. This also means the European Parliament is involved in the scheme. The combined size of MFF and the Next Generation EU fund reaches 1,8 billion euros.

The so-called ‘frugal’ Member States have for sure extracted a high price in exchange for their support for the deal. This includes higher budget rebates, a bizarre intergovernmental mechanism to interfere in the disbursements of the Recovery Plan, and lower ambition for the ordinary long- term budget. Still many analysts consider the deal as a Hamiltonian moment, if not in its details (the EU is not mutualising past debts), certainly in its spirit (the creation of a federal bond, which further down the road will require a common treasury and taxation).

Furthermore, the European Parliament was able to improve the European Council position, by securing 15 additional billion euros for strategic programs in the ordinary multiannual budget (Erasmus, Horizon 2020, Creative Europe, EU4Health, etc.), and a strong rule of law conditionality for the disbursement of the funds.

There are however two difficulties. One is methodological, the other political. On 16th November 2020, the Hungarian and Polish governments vetoed the MFF and the Own Resources Decision, unhappy with the rule of law regulation, endorsed by a qualified majority in Council. Indeed, articles 311 and 312 of the TFEU require unanimity for both decisions, something than itself calls for a reform of the Lisbon Treaty sooner than later.

There are two alternatives to this veto. Council could give in to Orban, watering down the rule of law conditionality. This will provoke a major institutional showdown with the European Parliament, which could in turn deny the consent to the proposed MFF. Alternatively, the EU institutions could try to circumvent the spurious position of two national governments by an intelligent use of the Lisbon Treaty provisions. In particular, the way forward implies decoupling the Recovery Plan from the proposed MFF.

First, article 122.2 of the TFEU allows Council to provide financial assistance to Member States under extraordinary circumstances and in accordance to some conditions (which are not specified). Two elements are noteworthy about this article. First, it does not say that Council will act by unanimity. Thus, qualified majority voting (QMV) applies as a rule (see article 16.3 TEU, and article 238 TFEU). Second, it does not specify the type of financial assistance. Thus, grants could be also given under this legal basis, as well as loans. Therefore, a bond-issuance can be agreed by QMV, and the capital raised can be spent in either loans or grants.

Therefore, a regulation could be adopted under article 122.2 TFEU by QMV in order to issue bonds and channel the funds through an ad-hoc fund, or through current EU programs under the prorogued MFF (article 312.4 TFEU). This additional spending is not necessarily in contradiction with the balanced budget rule (article 310.1 third paragraph TFEU), because the borrowed funds are considered “other revenue”/“external assigned revenue” under article 311 TFEU. Therefore, technically speaking debt is not an own resource and in principle would not be restricted by the prorogued MFF ceiling for spending. Indeed, the current MFF proposal did not raise the spending ceiling, just the own resources ceiling in order to comply with article 310.4 TFEU (overall respect for the own resources ceiling when adopting acts such incurring debt). This could solved by way of requiring guarantees from Member States, as it has been done with article 11 of the SURE Regulation. This can also be complemented by setting up a guarantee fund with the profits coming from the EIB, once fulfilled the reserve fund (article 22, EIB Statutes), a decision that could be taken by a majority of the Board of Governors (article 8, EIB Statutes).

Additionally, given the fact that article 122 TFEU is to be applied under extraordinary circumstances, this in itself could allow for its deployment as a stand-alone tool, exceptionally over and above MFF own resources ceilings.

Secondly, it is important to bear in mind that the adoption of the annual budget, under article 314 TFEU does not require unanimous agreement by Council. It is should possible to adopt and annual budget under a prorogued MFF, provided that article 312.4 TFEU is not too narrowly interpreted. It does say that MFF ceilings are extended alongside other dispositions corresponding to the last year of he said MFF, but it does not explicitly forbid adopting a new budget.

Then, both the bond issuance, and the 2021 annual budget that should start channelling the funds of the Recovery Plan could be adopted by QMV. Even the Recovery and Resilience Instrument, which is meant to provide the governance framework for the spending of most of the funds, is a regulation to be adopted as well under the co-decision procedure. Alternatively, if a budget for 2021 is not adopted for reasons connected with legal uncertainty, funds could still be disbursed from a fund set up on the basis of article 122.2 of TFEU.

So in reality Orban does not hold all the cards, provided Council is prepared to isolate him as his Polish colleague by way of approving , ideally, these regulations (bonds, budget, and governance) by QMV, as provided by the Lisbon Treaty. Of course the difficulty is that this alternative plan lacks the credibility provided by an increased own resources ceiling. However, the new basket of own resources is not in place, either. Under the current plan, the debt is not supposed to start redemption until the completion of the investments, while bonds are meant to be long-dated, to be repaid over thirty years. There is ample time to agree on the additional revenue sources later on.

Still, whether there is in the end an agreement of sorts or a circumvention of the two national vetoes as proposed, there is a larger political issue regarding the viability, accountability and democratic character of the whole scheme. Technically speaking, this is a temporary financial union (the €750 billion bond issuance is supposed to be a one-off), to be backed by a fiscal union that is to be introduced later on.

Making the deal a permanent feature of the Union’s economic policymaking toolbox will not, in the event, be an easy task. The ‘frugals’, even though they have been weakened by the UK’s departure, will nonetheless aggressively oppose any new bond emissions that are not linked to the pandemic. As for the fiscal dimension, the traditional attachment of nation states governments to the taxation prerogative it is well known. In addition, as any new EU funding sources of fiscal nature need to be approved by unanimity in the Council, as well as in 27 national parliaments, we are set for a tortuous process at best, or, at worst, for yet another dead end on EU taxation. In the event, national contributions to the budget would need to increase if new pan-European taxes are not agreed upon. Still, optimists bet on the fact that now that the Euro has a safe asset of sorts, it will almost be unavoidable to further issue debt beyond 2023, especially in a context of continued economic difficulties, while Member States may at the same time prefer to agree to some kind of EU taxation rather than increasing their direct national contributions to the EU budget.

Be that as may be, we must not forget that this ad-hoc financial union agreed by the European Council is mostly an intergovernmental affair. Under the current Lisbon Treaty rules, it is the Council, which solely approves debt issuance (Article 122), and the financial resources of the Union (Article 311). The European Parliament plays no role in the first instance, and it is only consulted in the second, although its agreement is required for the spending side of the budget. The anomaly of a Parliament that plays no real role in the revenue side of the budget (be it in the form of debt or taxes), but that has a deciding role in its expenditures, is a well-known feature of the EU’s institutional framework. This political and constitutional imbalance becomes even more acute if debt becomes a standard financing tool and revenue is rebalanced away from direct contributions made from the national budgets towards pan-European taxes that will fall on cross-border activities (digital platforms, and C02 emissions for example), and therefore on specific EU companies operating in the single market. It is hard to see why these taxes would be approved by national parliaments, when they are not indeed national forms of taxation, with no role whatsoever for the European Parliament.

Therefore, not only is a stronger European Parliament necessary, but also a more transparent, democratic and efficient Council, working hand in hand with the elected chamber, in a bicameral system. A fuller, more federal political union is thus the logical counterpart of the nascent financial and fiscal union. The Conference on the Future of Europe therefore is more relevant than ever.

The European Union is at a crucial turning point.

The concrete implementation of the Recovery Plan, presented by the European Commission to save and relaunch a sustainable European economy, is bringing out conflicts on a decisive point. Should European financial resources allocated to national governments be linked to respect for the rule of law or not?

Some governments, such as those of Poland and Hungary, oppose this conditionality.

Important political values are at stake.

A trilogue has developed under the European Union procedure between the Parliament, the Commission and the Presidency of the European Council.  An interim agreement was reached on 5 November.

For the outcome of trilogue on the Rule of law conditionality pls. see

https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/it/outcome-of-rule-of-law-conditionality-trilogues_20201105-1130-SPECIAL-PRESSER_vd

On October 20. in the European Parliament, 100 members from 18 EU countries had launched a high-profile Appeal with concrete proposals.

Below you can find the full text of the call with the list of signatories.

Startseite

The Appeal

The European Union has insufficient resources to effectively combat misuse of EU funds and violations of the rule of law in the member states. The situation in countries like Hungary and Poland clearly shows that the EU must finally act. The EU Commission and the European Parliament have put forward good proposals for a rule of law mechanism. At the EU summit in July, the member states greatly weakened this mechanism, and the German government was finally gutted for the search for compromise between the EU Council, the EU Commission and the EU Parliament. A qualified majority is required for sanctions, the criteria were limited to serious corruption, all others were deleted. In addition, the Council, i.e. unanimity, should deal with sanctions. 

For the next round of the trialogue procedure today we have launched this appeal, which over 100 parliamentarians from 19 countries have signed.

The European Union is founded on the shared values of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental human rights. This is enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty of the EU.

The German Presidency of the Council of the European Union is currently facing a tremendous challenge: It must find a compromise on the next EU budget and the Next Generation EU recovery plan. Both dossiers would have a real added value for European citizens, since they will help to overcome the economic consequences of the Corona crisis and hopefully kick-start Europe’s transformation into an ecological and social market economy.

At the same time, negotiations are led to protect the European Budget and our financial interests against breaches of the Rule of Law.

We strongly regret the fact that the European Council significantly weakened the efforts of the Commission and Parliament to uphold the rule of law framework for the MFF and the Next Generation EU Fund. We therefore call on the German Presidency and all Member State governments to stand up for an EU conditionality on the rule of law that deserves this name and to agree to

• A clear and decisive process for determining adherence to the rule of law. This should take the form of a delegated decision by the Commission that can only be reversed by a qualified majority vote in the Council.     
• A scope that includes violations of the principles of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, at a bare minimum.
• Take out the option of Member countries being able to postpone an agreement to a future Council meeting.
• A system that allows European citizens, local authorities and companies to access EU funds directly, should their government’s behavior prevent them from receiving them through regular channels. No European citizen should be punished for their government’s failure to respect and uphold the founding principles of our Union.

This call to action is highly urgent. What we are facing is an unprecedented and escalating crisis of our shared values, which threatens the very survival of the EU as a project of democracy and peace. The rule of law is no matter of East versus West, no matter of frugals versus friends of cohesion. European democracy is a matter concerning all European citizens – let’s protect our shared values!

Dr. Franziska Brantner, European policy spokesperson of the Green Party in the Bundestag

Daniel Freund, negotiator in the Committee on Budgetary Control for the Green Group in the European

List of all signatories

Auken, Margrete	MEP	Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti
Nienass, Niklas	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Peter-Hansen, Kira	MEP	Denmark	Socialistisk Folkeparti
Strik, Tineke	MEP	Netherlands	GroenLinks
Guerreiro, Francisco	MEP	Portugal	Independent
Ujhelyi, István	MEP	Hungary	Magyar Szocialista Párt
Nart, Javier	MEP	Spain	Independent
Vana, Monika	MEP	Austria	Die Grünen
Köster, Dietmar	MEP	Germany	SPD
Gozi, Sandro	MEP	France	Liste Renaissance
Profant, Ondřej	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Navrkal, František	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Martínek, Tomáš	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Lipavský, Jan	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Kopřiva, František	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Biteau, Benoit	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Urtasun, Ernest	MEP	Spain	Catalunya en Comú
Spurek, Sylwia	MEP	Poland	Independant
Puigdemont, Carles	MEP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Comín, Antoni	MEP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Ponsatí, Clara	MEP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Bricmont, Saskia	MEP	Belgium	Ecologistes Confédérés
Von Cramon-Taubadel	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Furore, Mario	MEP	Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle
Schieder, Andreas	MEP	Austria	SPÖ
Heide, Hannes	MEP	Austria	SPÖ
Vollath, Bettina	MEP	Austria	SPÖ
Hautala, Heidi	MEP	Finland	Vihreä liitto
Piri, Kati	MEP	Netherlands	Partij van de Arbeid
Wagenknecht, Lukas	MP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Kaljurand, Marina	MEP	Estonia	Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond
Anisko, Tomasz	MP	Poland	Partii Zieloni
Urszula, Zielinska	MP	Poland	Partii Zieloni
Malgorzata, Tracz	MP	Poland	Partii Zieloni
Toussaint, Marie	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Cormand, David	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Rivasi, Michèle	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Delbos-Corfield, Gwendoline	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Sartouri, Mounir	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Jadot, Yannick	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Yenbou, Salima	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Roose, Caroline	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Gruffat, Claude	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Careme, Damien	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Alfonsi, Francois	MEP	France	Europe Écologie
Dobrev, Klara	MEP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Molnár, Csaba	MEP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Ara-Kovács, Attila	MEP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Rónai, Sándor	MEP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Gyurcsány, Ferenc	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Vadai, Ágnes	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Arató, Gergely	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Hajdu, Lászlo	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Oláh, Lajos	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Sebián-Petrovszki, László	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Varju, László	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Bösz, Anett	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Varga, Zóltán	MP	Hungary	Demokratikus Koalíció
Sidl, Günther	MEP	Austria	SPÖ
Orel, Petr	MP	Czech Republic	Sz
Goláň, Tomáš	MP	Czech Republic	BEZPP
Tracz, Malgorzata	MP	Poland	Partia Zieloni
Anisko, Tomasz	MP	Poland	Koalicja Obywatelska
Jachira, Klaudia	MP	Poland	Koalicja Obywatelska
Sterczewski, Franciszek	MP	Poland	Koalicja Obywatelska
Ernst-Dziedzic, Ewa	MP	Austria	Die Grünen
Borràs, Laura	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Nogueras, Míriam	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Cuevillas, Jaume Alonso	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Illamola, Mariona	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Matamala, Jami	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Cleries, Josep Lluís	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Castellví, Assumpció	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Rivero, Maite	MP	Spain	Junts per Catalunya – Lliures per Europa
Gonzalez, Monica Silvana	MEP	Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
Delli, Karima	MEP	France	EELV
Mounir, Satouri	MEP	France	EELV
Benarroche, Guy	MP	France	EELV
Dantec, Ronan	MP	France	ESNT
Benbassa, Esther	MP	France	EELV
Dossus, Thomas	MP	France	EELV
Fernique, Jacques	MP	France	EELV
Kairidis, Dimitris	MP	Greece	New Democracy
Barna, Dan	MP	Romania	USR*
Drula, Catalin	MP	Romania	USR*
Mihail, Radu	MP	Romania	USR*
De Marco, Monique	MP	Fance	EELV
Tērauda, Vita Anda	MP	Latvia	Attistibai/Par!
Fusacchia, Alessandro	MP	Italy	Gruppo Misto
Giannakopoulou, Nantia	MP	Greece	PASOK
Barrena, Pernando	MEP	Spain	EH BILDU
Aguilar, Juan	MEP	Spain	Partido Socialista Obrero Español
Clement, Sven	MP	Luxembourg	Piraten
Gregorová, Markéta	MEP	Czech Republic	Piráti
Freund, Daniel	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Brantner, Franziska	MP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Brugger, Agnieszka	MP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Hofreiter, Anton	MP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Kyuchyuk, Ilhan	MEP	Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
Mihaylova, Iskra	MEP	Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
Alieva-Veli, Atidzhe	MEP	Bulgaria	Movement for Rights and Freedoms
Muroni, Rossella	MP	Italy	Liberi e Uguali
Palazzotto, Erasmo	MP	Italy	Liberi e Uguali
Magi, Riccardo	MP	Italy	Plus Europa
Lagodinsky, Sergey	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Geese, Alexandra	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Giegold, Sven	MEP	Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
Strugariu, Ramona	MEP	Romania	USR Plus
Klaver, Jesse	MP	Netherlands	GroenLinks

* on behalf of the USR group in the Romanian Parliament

The Conference on the future of Europe should be convened by the end of the year. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced it in her inaugural speech and the European Parliament recently urged that it be convened before the end of 2020 (Resolution of 18/6/20). Yet some unexpected obstacles risk drastically reducing the significance of the Conference.

At present, the main issue is the European Parliament’s proposal to entrust the presidency of the Conference to Guy Verhofstadt, who for years has been fighting for a democratic and federal reform of the Union. Various members of the European Council have flatly opposed this proposal. An article in Politico (De La Baume, 13/10) reports: “Verhofstadt was considered a nonstarter by a number of governments in the Council”, due to the fact that he is seen as a “champion of European federalism”. The hunt for alternative candidates is currently under way.

We can only surmise that in Europe it is legitimate to be a liberal, democratic, socialist, green or sovereignist, just as long as you are not a federalist. Yet if this view prevails, the Conference will be dead in the water. Obstructing the European Parliament without a serious reason for doing so is an insult to European democracy: the European Parliament is the only body legitimized by the popular vote, something that the Council lacks. Nevertheless, sovereignist governments are intent on drastically narrowing the political horizons of the debate. They want to rule out any discussion of European federalism in advance, despite the fact that President Macron, when proposing the Conference, called for a debate “without taboos”. Evidently, however, some issues remain taboo.

Yet European democracy and European federalism are two sides of the same coin. In this dramatic year, with the pandemic, many significant proposals for European citizens drafted by the Commission and Parliament have been blocked by means of the unanimity vote in the Council (the dispute over the budget is a case in point): a small minority of countries and population circumventing the vast majority.  It is the tyranny of the minority. If we want to get past this impasse, we need to look to the lessons of the federalist thought (which dates back to Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton), because the principles of federalism can help disentangle the problem.

It should nonetheless be noted that looking to existing federal states is of little help. To date, federalism has regarded sovereign nation states (such as the USA, Canada, India, Australia, Switzerland, etc.) thus becoming – in contemporary political culture – a mechanism for administrative decentralization. In Europe, on the contrary, the founding fathers designed the first institutions, the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC), as a “work in progress” towards a federal union. The Schuman Declaration is very clear on this. To overcome the current obstacles it would be useful to take a step towards supranational federalism. European federalism will be different from all existing federal systems. Not all competences and powers of national governments will have to be assigned to Europe, contrary to what sovereignist forces assert, including those governments that reject the ideals of the very institutions they benefit from. The criterion of the vertical division of powers applies to policies for trade, taxation, security, defence, the environment, health etc.

I do not intend to enter into a debate that will have to be conducted by the representatives of European citizens in the Conference. I merely wish to note that the Union faces internal and international challenges that call for urgent structural reforms. Issues like immigration, European security, the atomic rearmament of the major powers and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the development of the new information technologies, environmental disasters and pandemics cannot be tackled on a national level, but require a capacity for European action, at the federal level.

Without policies befitting the importance of the issues at stake, there will be no cohesion between European citizens and the Union will remain weak. A political community cannot exist without common ideals, a shared identity and effective policies. Some indications for how to proceed in this direction have already been provided by Josep Borrell in his message to the United Nations: “The EU Stands with the UN” (Project Syndicate, Sept. 22). Borrell asserts: “A world governed by agreed rules is the very basis of our shared security, freedoms, and prosperity. A rule-based international order makes states secure, keeps people free and companies willing to invest, and ensures that the Earth’s environment is protected. The alternative – might makes right – has been tried for most of human history, and its horrific record is the best argument for the multilateral system. Unfortunately, it is increasingly being tried again, with the results visible to all. This is not the approach of the EU. We will continue to believe in and support the UN”.

The EU’s role in the world will be one of the crucial themes of the Conference on the future of Europe. Today’s young people are concerned about the future of life on our planet and are asking government leaders for a bolder policies to combat the pollution of the biosphere and construct a peaceful world. The EU has no future if the planet has no future.

The politicians in the European Council who want to exclude the prospect of a democratic and supranational Europe from the debate should explain to young people why it is better to remain closeted inside national borders.